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INTRODUCTION
THE LOCAL DYNAMICS  
OF CONFLICTS IN  
SYRIA AND LIBYA
LUIGI NARBONE
The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) 
is undergoing profound transformations. Long-
term structural changes of a socio-economic and 
demographic nature combine with the dynamics 
triggered by regime change and/or the armed 
conflicts which ensued from the 2011 uprisings. 
Together, they are producing major effects at the 
transnational, national and local levels. 
The pre-2011 regional order is being challenged, 
leading to a multiplication and intensification 
of geopolitical confrontations among regional 
and international powers which augment the 
risks of instability for the region and beyond. 
At the national level, political changes have led 
to instability which has sometimes deteriorated 
into armed conflicts. As a result, both the overall 
regional configuration and the internal situations 
of individual nation states are being redesigned 
and rearranged. New fault lines and new alliances 
have emerged. Borders have become flash points 
on the region’s evolving political map, through 
reactivation of border tensions, a loss of central 
state control over border areas, and even a 
questioning of post-colonial national borders 
(Syria-Iraq; Libya). 
In areas where conflicts have degenerated into 
armed confrontation, new forms of sub-national 
governance have emerged, often based on military 
control or ethnic-community/tribal/sectarian 
divisions which break up national territorial 
integrity. They pose long-term challenges 
to the eventual re-establishment of national 
sovereignty and increase the difficulties involved 
in meaningful conflict resolution. Jihadist groups 
are taking advantage of this situation to expand 
their activities, and thus are threatening the whole 
region. 
Against this backdrop, Syria and Libya constitute 
two major crisis areas. These dramatic conflicts 
have consequences both for the region and for 
neighbouring Europe. 
The human and economic cost of five years of 
armed conflict in Syria is tremendous. The UN 
estimates a death toll of over 400,000 people, 
while according to the Syrian Centre for Policy 
research the country is facing a total economic 
loss of 468% of 2010 GDP and an unemployment 
rate over 52%. By the end of 2015, about 45% of 
the population were displaced. Some 6.4 million 
of this population-in-movement continue to live 
in Syria as internally displaced persons (IDPs).1 
However, the consequences of the Syrian conflict 
go far beyond the country’s borders. The civil 
war has pushed over 4.5 million people to flee 
into neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, 
with destabilizing effects on these countries both 
politically and on their socio-economic fabrics. 
The Syrian refugee outflow has spilled over to 
Europe, creating the greatest refugee crisis since 
World War II and putting EU solidarity to test.
In Libya, the fall of Qaddafi has led to deep 
territorial fragmentation, a split between two 
main rival camps and many small-scale conflicts 
of varying intensity raging across the country. 
The inability of political forces to carry through 
a meaningful transition has resulted in armed 
confrontation between forces competing for 
power and resources. The conflict has been fuelled 
by uncontrolled migration flows and trafficking 
of all kinds, factors which are likely to further 
destabilize Libya in the future. The Islamic State 
(IS) organization’s attempts to consolidate and 
expand its presence in Libya are the latest reason 
for concern and its success in consolidating its 
presence could have ripple effects in neighbouring 
countries, posing important threats to Europe’s 
security.
The ongoing migration crisis and the terrorist 
attacks in Europe have brought the refugee issue 
and Jihadist radicalization to the fore. Both of 
1 Syrian Centre for Policy Research, “Confronting Fragmenta-
tion. Impact of Syrian Crisis Report,” Quartely Based Report 
(2015), February 2016.
these issues appear inextricably linked to the 
developments and continuing violence in the 
Middle East and North Africa. Hence, these 
regional conflicts have attracted the growing 
attention of Western and European analysts. 
The Syrian war and the intricate Libyan conflict 
are the object of much debate. Most analyses 
focus on geostrategic or geopolitical rationales 
and implications, on ideological and religious 
explanations, on the diplomatic processes at the 
national level, on the role of international actors, 
or on the ever-changing military developments on 
the ground. It is often said that, given the degree 
of territorial fragmentation and the importance of 
regional-tribal cleavages in Libya and sectarian-
ethnic divisions in Syria, the inclusion of local 
actors should be key to a lasting resolution of the 
conflicts. In practice, however, these complex local 
dynamics are generally overlooked or neglected as 
information on local actors and the multiform and 
quickly-changing local scenes is difficult to gather 
and fieldwork in war-torn zones and regions is 
often impossible. 
This ebook, Inside Wars: Local Dynamics of 
Conflicts in Syria and Libya, aims to make a 
contribution to understanding of some of the 
under-researched local dynamics of the Syrian and 
Libyan conflicts. It is the result of two dedicated 
panel discussions during the inaugural Research 
Meeting of the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Middle East Directions 
Programme, at the European University Institute, 
Florence on 10-11 March 2016. 
The objective of the ebook is to create a new 
narrative of these conflicts which sheds light 
on their local dimensions by looking closely 
at the social, political, economic and religious 
transformations produced by the uprisings and 
the armed conflicts that followed. Only with a 
good understanding of these dynamics will it 
be possible to start an inclusive and meaningful 
process of conflict resolution and post-conflict 
transition.
On Syria, it explores issues such as the political and 
economic impact of Syria’s implosion; the local 
governance dynamics in opposition- and Kurdish-
controlled areas; and the limits of foreign influence 
in ensuring the success of armed groups in what is 
often perceived as a proxy war between external 
powers. On Libya, it focuses on a case study of 
local dialogue, mediation and reconciliation and 
its interplay with the overall national political 
and military process; on the role of local actors 
smuggling and trafficking in border regions and 
the development of trans-border economic spaces 
and its political dimension; on the role of youth 
culture in the development of jihadism; and finally 
on IS’s penetration strategy and its reality on the 
ground. The various articles attempt to translate 
the findings of fieldwork-based research into 
policy recommendations in a language that can be 
of use to policy-makers. 
The Middle East Directions Research 
Meeting, entitled Rethinking the Middle East: 
Transformations, Flows and (Dis)orders, brought 
together over 40 researchers, policy-makers and 
activists working on the MENA region. It was the 
inaugural event of the new Middle East Directions 
Programme at the RSCAS. This programme has 
the ambition of becoming a point of reference for 
researchers on the MENA region. It will favour 
exchanges and long-term collaborations between 
researchers and activists from the two shores of 
the Mediterranean, putting emphasis on empirical 
findings in order to produce academic analyses 
relevant for policy-makers. The main objective is 
to stimulate new approaches and policy responses 
to the many problems which affect the region and 
have a direct impact on Europe. 
PART 1. 
THE SYRIAN CONFLICT
Source: “Wikimedia Commons”
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SYRIA’S IMPLOSION: 
POLITICAL AND  
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
JIHAD YAZIGI
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of 2013, Syria’s front lines have 
broadly stabilized and the country is now divided 
into four main parts: one under the control of the 
regime, another of Islamic State (IS), a third of 
the Kurds, and the fourth of various opposition 
groups.
There is now a wide array of competing local 
autonomous administrations, school curriculums 
and currencies.  Syria’s economic map has also 
been modified with a transfer of private and 
public investments from the country’s main 
economic backbone along the Damascus-Aleppo 
line towards the coastal area.
This paper will try to explain Syria’s ongoing 
implosion and analyse the impact these changes 
are having on the country and on the terms under 
which the conflict will be resolved.
BACKGROUND
Prior to the uprising, from a socio-economic 
perspective Syria could be divided into two parts. 
The western part of the country, which comprises 
Source: “Wikimedia Commons”
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the Damascus-Aleppo axis, including all the 
main cities in addition to the coast, was the more 
developed. The east and south of the country, 
consisting of the provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and 
Suweida (south), and of Deir-ez-Zor, Hassakeh 
and Raqqa (east), were much less developed in 
terms of their socio-economic indicators.
Exceptions obviously existed. The province of Idlib, 
west of Aleppo, was among the country’s poorest. 
Mostly rural, this province was actually detached 
from Aleppo in 1958 in order to weaken Syria’s 
northern metropolis. Similarly, the countryside 
around Aleppo had poor levels of economic and 
social development. The urban/rural divide in 
Aleppo is, indeed, one of the most stubborn lines 
of fracture in the country.
Meanwhile, the eastern provinces are rich in 
natural resources. Oil is extracted from fields 
around Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor as well as in the 
extreme northeast on the border with Iraq. In 
addition, wheat, barley and cotton, the country’s 
three strategic crops are grown there. The 
country’s water resources are also mainly located 
there. The resource-rich part of the country was 
therefore only reaping limited benefits from its 
underground resources, a pattern seen in many 
other developing countries.
Syria was also governed by a relatively strong central 
state. The state institutions were active and spread 
across the country; the government continued 
to supply services (schooling, education, etc.), to 
invest in infrastructure, and also to intervene in 
the pricing of goods sold to consumers (bread, 
heating oil, etc.) and to producers (farming 
inputs, electricity, concessionary loans). In 
underdeveloped areas, the government remained 
an important employer, partly as a consequence of 
weak private investment.
The decade of Bashar al-Assad, in particular 
after 2005, saw, however, a reduction in the role 
of the state. Public investment was on the decline 
and subsidies for most goods and services were 
reduced. Government economic policies were 
also geared towards the services sector and to 
the benefit of urban centres at the expense of the 
suburbs, the countryside and generally the more 
remote parts of the country.
In a departure from past policies of the Baath 
Governments, the responsibility for the 
development of these areas was transferred to 
the private sector. Hence, companies investing in 
remote areas of the country were given tax breaks 
and other incentives as well as more flexible 
regulations. In the absence of a strong political 
will, however, investment and development in 
these areas lagged. It is not that the government 
did not realize the existing divide and the need to 
address it, but it did so too late. At the beginning 
of March 2011, only weeks after the outbreak of 
the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings and just days 
before that of the Syrian revolt, Bashar Al-Assad 
rushed to the north-eastern province of Hassakeh 
to announce the launch of the Tigris River 
diversion project, after more than three decades 
of delays – the project had an investment cost of 
USD 3 billion and was expected to irrigate large 
tracts of land, develop agricultural production and 
create jobs for thousands of people.
THE CONFLICT DESTROYS THE 
STATUS QUO AND DIVIDES THE 
COUNTRY INTO FOUR BROAD 
AREAS
Fast forward to 2016. The war has had a devastating 
impact on the economy and life of Syrians. The 
numbers are telling. According to a recent report 
published by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research 
(SCPR), by the end of 2015 the war had cost some 
USD 255 billion, GDP is less than half its 2010 
value, unemployment is above 50 percent and 
poverty is over 85 percent.
Four distinct areas
An important and lasting impact of the war, 
however, is the fragmentation of the country into 
at least four distinct areas:
• One controlled by the regime, which 
corresponds to a very large extent to the 
western and wealthier part of Syria mentioned 
above: the coastal area and the main 
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Damascus-Aleppo axis except for some rural 
and suburban regions and around half the city 
of Aleppo, which are mostly under the control 
of the opposition, and to a lesser extent, the 
Nusra Front.
• Another is controlled by the Islamic State in 
the east of the country, along the Euphrates 
River, broadly corresponding to the Arab 
tribal areas historically tied to Iraq, around the 
oil fields of Deir-ez-Zor and Raqqa.
• A third area in the northeast and in a pocket 
west of Aleppo is controlled by the Democratic 
Union Party, the Syrian branch of the PKK. 
These areas are where Kurds form a majority of 
the population or at least the most numerous 
minority. They are not, however, the only 
areas with a high concentration of Kurds; the 
cities of Aleppo and Damascus together host 
hundreds of thousands of them.
• Finally, a fourth area is under the control of 
various opposition groups, in addition to the 
Nusra Front. The opposition parts of Syria 
are themselves fragmented and have no 
geographic continuity, unlike the previous 
three areas.
The three latter areas correspond to the 
underdeveloped southern and eastern parts of 
Syria.
Regime areas
Although much less destroyed than the rest of the 
country, and in spite of the appearance of stability, 
changes affecting the regime-controlled parts 
of the country are having a profound impact on 
the broader Syrian economy and society because 
of the economic, political and cultural weight of 
these areas.
In this part of the country, where almost two thirds 
of the Syrians still living in the country reside, a 
new balance is being established. The Damascus-
Aleppo axis, which traditionally constitutes Syria’s 
spinal column, has been significantly weakened 
by the physical destruction of its cities – half of 
Aleppo and Homs, the suburbs of Damascus – by 
the flight of its investors and its middle class, and 
by the weakening of the role, and institutions, of 
the state.
Private and public investment – or rather what has 
remained of it given that the current investment 
levels are only a fraction of what they were pre-
uprising – is shifting to the coastal area. In 2015, 
for instance, 32 percent of the large private 
investments licensed by the Syrian Investment 
Agency were located in the Tartous and Lattakia 
provinces, while only 27 percent were located in 
Damascus and Aleppo. By comparison, in 2010 
Damascus and Aleppo attracted a combined 
40.5 percent of the projects licensed by the SIA 
compared with only 4.5 percent for Lattakia and 
Tartous. Similarly, last year in Tartous the number 
of small business projects doubled: the number of 
new individual companies created in that province 
increased from 867 in 2014 to 1,752. The number 
of shareholding companies increased from 119 in 
2014 to 251 in 2015.
Private capital is attracted by the safety of the 
coastal area, in particular the Tartous governorate, 
which has witnessed almost no fighting or protests 
since the beginning of the uprising. In addition, 
the flow of people displaced from other regions of 
the country has brought investors that want to use 
their capital as well as to benefit from a relative 
increase in demand in that region. The shift to the 
coast is therefore partly a consequence of a change 
in the demographics – Alawites are no longer 
believed to constitute a majority of the residents 
in this part of the country.
To a large extent, public sector investment, 
meanwhile, has moved to the coast as part of 
the government policy of satisfying its core 
constituency. In autumn 2015, at a number of 
events widely covered by the state media, the 
Prime Minister, Wael al-Halqi, announced the 
launch of a combined SYP 30 billion worth of 
public investments in the provinces of Lattakia 
and Tartous. At the same time, it was announced 
that the government would allocate a meagre SYP 
500 million to the city of Aleppo.
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The coastal area also continues to maintain strong 
links with Damascus and the central Government 
through the state apparatus. A majority of 
working-age Alawites are believed to be employed 
by the state both in its military and civilian wings. 
The state has always been an important supplier of 
jobs and revenue for this community and this role 
has increased with the war and the contraction 
of the overall economy. This strong dependence 
of the Alawite community on the state is one 
important factor that stands against any prospect 
of autonomy for the coastal area and which raises 
the stakes for the control of Damascus.
The composition of the business community in 
these areas is also changing. To a large extent, 
traditional investors have left the country and 
have relocated in other parts of the region or the 
world, and have been replaced by new figures that 
have built their wealth from war-related activities. 
Elections at the Chambers of Commerce in Aleppo 
and Damascus at the end of 2014, for instance, saw 
a significant change in the membership of these 
chambers. In Aleppo, 10 of the 12 elected board 
members are new investors, many of whom were 
unheard of prior to the uprising. In Damascus, 7 
of the 12 are in the same situation.
Outside the regime areas
The regions that are beyond the control of regime 
forces, some of them for more than three years 
now, have had to adapt to the situation and create 
new institutions and forms of governance. The 
traditional economic production patterns and 
centres have been destroyed, investors and the 
business class have left, and the trade and transport 
networks have been disrupted. This destruction 
follows decades of relative underdevelopment. 
For the population in these areas, the new 
institutions that have been established to fill the 
vacuum left by the destruction of the pre-war 
economy and the absence of the state, often – 
although not always – come with more legitimacy 
than the government because:
• many are elected, in particular in opposition 
areas, albeit election processes often leave 
much to be desired;
• they are run by people from the region, many 
of whom have worked and fought to protect 
their community from the regime;
• they form part of a wider political project 
that is accepted by the population (Kurds and 
opposition).
In practice, these institutions are now competing 
with those of the government, and Syria is in a 
situation where at least three different institutions 
call themselves, or pretend to act, as a government, 
at least four school curricula are being taught to 
schoolchildren, and three currencies are being 
used as a medium of exchange.
The Kurds are licensing investment projects and 
publications, and in the last two years have passed 
dozens of laws governing life in their areas; IS is 
raising taxes, licensing investments and operating 
a police force; the opposition areas have plenty 
of elected councils that run day-to-day life. The 
interim government of the opposition has several 
ministries and has established bodies to distribute 
wheat and bread, run hospitals and channel aid 
inside the country.
The value of the expenditures by these newly-
created authorities has been steadily increasing. 
According to the estimates of SCPR, the combined 
value of ‘public’ expenditure in the opposition, 
Kurdish and IS areas – i.e. by the institutions that 
sprang up in these areas – is now equivalent to 13.2 
percent of Syria’s 2015 GDP, compared with 31.6 
percent for public spending in regime areas. In 
other words, ‘public’ consumption in areas outside 
government control is now equivalent to more 
than a third of total public spending, a number 
that reflects the entrenchment and growing 
importance of the various new institutions that 
have been established across the country to replace 
the state.
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CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS: THREE 
ISSUES TO ADDRESS REGARDING 
THE COUNTRY’S IMPLOSION
The stability of Syria’s internal borders in the 
past three years, the entrenchment of the newly-
established institutions, and the empowerment 
of new actors will raise serious challenges when 
the conflict ends. One of these is decentralisation. 
Beyond the Kurdish issue, the resolution of which 
is likely to involve a strong level of autonomy, 
decentralization provides one of the rare options 
that will allow all the new forces that have emerged 
from the conflict to be brought in. Calls for more 
local power are being heard across Syria, and one 
of the main problems preventing the unification 
of the opposition is actually the strong sense 
of autonomy developed in local communities 
across the country. The conflict has also seen 
the expression of long-hidden suspicions and 
distrust between cities, between cities and their 
surrounding countryside, and between different 
regions. Among urban elites, in particular in 
Damascus, decentralisation is often associated 
with partition and a loss of sovereignty and will 
therefore be opposed by many on both sides of the 
regime/opposition divide.
Another issue, which is partly related to 
decentralisation, is the fair allocation of resources. 
We have seen that the most resource-rich parts 
of the country are also the least developed. It is 
unlikely that these areas will again accept control 
by Damascus of their resources. Expenses in the 
Kurdish areas, for instance, are to a large extent 
funded with the oil extracted in these regions. In 
Deir-ez-Zor, prior to the emergence of IS, local 
tribes and communities had fought for the control 
of oil fields, which many perceived as being 
‘stolen’ by Damascus. Allocating more resources 
to the regions will face opposition from any future 
Government, which will be short of revenue, in 
particular given that any reconstruction drive as 
significant as that needed by Syria will require a 
strong and well-funded central state.
The Syrian conflict has also raised the issue of 
the role of community in a state formally made 
of equal citizens. Sectarian and ethnic tensions 
have been exposed by the conflict, including 
the minorities’ fear of  islamism, the Kurds’ fear 
of Arabism, the Christian Assyrians’ fear of the 
Kurds and the Sunnis’ profound sense of injustice 
and repression by the minorities. Beyond fears, 
the need to express cultural identities that have 
long been repressed has also been exposed. The 
question of how to build a state that keeps an 
equal distance from all of its citizens but at the 
same time guarantees their political and cultural 
rights, as individuals and communities, remains 
unanswered
The European Union would be well advised to 
encourage Syrian opposition groups, in a first stage, 
and other parties, such as the Kurds, in a second 
stage to engage in discussions on decentralization. 
Resistance to the idea is to an important extent 
a consequence of a poor understanding of the 
concept and of the issues at stake.
Engaging the younger generation would be 
particularly useful given their attitude that is 
broadly more receptive to the idea.
The EU should in particular draw from the 
experience of several of its member countries such 
as Germany and Spain, where decentralization is 
put in practice.
The EU should also strengthen local institutions 
through funding and training and by encouraging 
them to develop cooperation and move from 
very localised institutions, i.e. at the town level, 
to more regional ones. Democracy must also be 
encouraged through the election rather than the 
appointment of local level representatives.
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LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
DYNAMICS IN 
OPPOSITION-CONTROLLED 
AREAS IN SYRIA
AGNÈS FAVIER1
INTRODUCTION
After more than 40 years of centralized control 
in Syria, the nature and length of the conflict 
has led to a fragmentation of the territory and 
1 This working paper has greatly benefitted from insights by 
Amer Karkoutly and Assaad al-Achi The author also thanks 
Jamil Mouawad for his careful reading of the text. The views 
expressed in this paper are the author’s own. 
to a de-concentration of civilian and military 
powers, mainly in opposition-controlled areas but 
also to some extent in those under the regime’s 
control.2 In fact, and partly due to the nature of 
the regime’s repression, the local dimension was 
2 Thomas Pierret, “Damas: l’heure de la décomposition”, Politique 
internationale, n°150, winter 2016.
Source: Information Unit of Orient Policy Center, May 25, 2016
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central to the framework of the uprising in 2011 
and then its militarization.3 Despite the escalation 
of the conflict into a total war, the local level has 
remained a laboratory par excellence where new 
actors have emerged and experimented with news 
forms of governance.
Among the local actors who have attempted to 
provide support for the population and to govern 
and administer territories, the local administrative 
structures that have been established by the 
revolutionary forces since 2012, also known as 
local councils, were originally conceived and 
developed to act as the main alternative to the state 
institutions at the local level, but also eventually 
as the cornerstone for any state-building efforts in 
Syria’s post-war reconstruction period. Despite the 
continuous and enormous challenges facing these 
local councils on the ground, they remain active 
in providing daily public services. Alongside other 
locally well-anchored actors, they could constitute 
the steppingstone through the transition period. 
This paper aims to study these local councils 
in their position within a network of dynamics 
and interactions, both vertically with respect to 
‘external’ actors (such as foreign donors and Syrian 
political institutions in exile) and horizontally 
in relation to other competing or parallel local 
groups. Based on empirical observations and 
in-depth interviews with opposition members 
(local councils, civil activists, political figures and 
representatives of armed groups) conducted in 
Gaziantep between October 2013 and September 
2015, it presents some general findings, structured 
in response to three main questions. How have 
local administrative structures been established 
and then consolidated or disappeared in relation to 
two main patterns: access to external resources and 
military developments? What is the relationship 
between opposition local and central authorities? 
How and to what extent do local councils gain 
legitimacy in specific local areas?
3 Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila al-Shami, Burning Country: Syr-
ians in Revolution and War, London, Pluto Press, 2016.
LOCAL COUNCILS4: BETWEEN 
GRASSROOTS INITIATIVES AND 
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS 
In 2012, several local councils emerged as 
spontaneous initiatives in connection with 
the grassroots revolt, in a similar fashion to 
the appearance of the Local Coordination 
Committees (LCCs) and in cooperation with 
them. Beyond the main task of organizing and 
documenting peaceful demonstrations, the LCCs 
also started to focus on the provision of emergency 
healthcare and to provide support to the families 
of prisoners. In this context, the local councils 
had the main aim of responding to the immediate 
needs of the population, but also aimed to widen 
and expand on the activities originally undertaken 
by the LCCs. The thinking behind the idea of 
local councils5 was that the revolutionary society 
should organize itself independently of the state. 
These self-managed local councils would serve 
as local alternatives to the state, with the primary 
objective of protecting the population rather than 
controlling the territory. 
Even if the local councils were originally regarded 
and analysed as bottom-up institutions, created to 
fill the void left by disappeared or collapsed Syrian 
4 According to a survey of 405 local councils (that were formed 
or reformed during the Syrian revolution and were almost all 
active) in the first quarter of 2015, the total number of local 
councils was estimated at around 800. The survey was held in 
all Syrian districts except for Raqqa and Suweida. The num-
ber includes district or provincial councils at the governorate 
level, and municipal, city and neighbourhood councils at the 
local level. The majority of the local councils (almost 80%) were 
formed for the first time during 2012 and 2013. “Local Councils 
of Syria Indicator needs”, published by the Local Administra-
tion Council Unit, July 2015.
5 The main architect behind the idea of the local councils was 
Omar Aziz, a 63-year-old activist who was arrested in October 
2012 and died under torture in a regime jail in February 2013. 
His first call to establish ‘local councils’ appeared in October 
2011, at the same time when the first political platform of the 
opposition was being created in Istanbul (the ‘Syrian National 
Council’, or SNC). 
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governmental institutions,6 they were not in fact 
operating in a vacuum and their development 
hinged upon two main dynamics: first, the policy 
of donors; and second, direct confrontation with 
the regime and later with IS and the Kurdish 
forces. 
A heavy dependence on external 
resources
The creation of local councils was affected from 
the very beginning by the intervention of external 
actors. In fact, donor policies over the last four 
years have been characterized by erratic and non-
coordinated support. At the same time when the 
first local council was established in early 2012, 
wealthy Syrian opposition expatriates, in addition 
to European governments and foreign private 
companies, started to express their willingness to 
provide assistance to the local councils whenever 
they were in place. The year 2012 therefore 
witnessed the implementation of a policy of direct 
aid to the local councils by Western countries, 
mainly under the impetus of France, which 
organized an international meeting in Paris in 
October 2012 dedicated to supporting the local 
revolutionary councils. This involvement was, 
6 Most of the analyses of local administrative structures in op-
position-controlled areas were published between 2013 and 
2014, based on fieldwork conducted in 2012 and 2013 at a time 
when the armed insurrection was gaining more and more ter-
ritory and when civil administrations were being established. 
See, for example, A. Baczko, G. Dorronsoro, A. Quesnay, “The 
Civilian Administration of the Aleppo Insurgency”, Noria, 
October 2013; Menapolis, “Local Councils in Syria. A Sover-
eignty Crisis in Liberated Areas”, Policy Paper, September 2013; 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Local Administration 
Structures in opposition-held areas in Syria”, Research Report, 
April 2014; Institute For War & Peace Reporting, “Local Gov-
ernance inside Syria”, 2014; Rana Khalaf, “Governance without 
Government in Syria: Civil Society and State Building during 
Conflict”, Syria Studies, 2014; Frantz Glasman, “Vie locale et 
concurrence de projets politiques dans les territoires sous con-
trôle de l’opposition, des djihadistes et des Kurdes en Syrie”, 
October 2014, http://www.academia.edu/10032604/Vie_lo-
cale_et_concurrence_de_projets_politiques_dans_les_terri-
toires_sous_contr%C3%B4le_de_lopposition_des_djihadistes_
et_des_Kurdes_en_Syrie. For more recent studies in Arabic, 
Sabr Darwiche, Syria: Experience of liberated cities, Al Rayyes 
Books, January 2015; and Omran Center for Strategic Studies, 
The Second Annual Report, March 2016.
however, only for a very short period of time. In 
fact, with the creation of the Syrian Opposition 
Coalition (or SOC, which replaced the Syrian 
National Council) in November 2012, many 
countries operating under the umbrella of the 
‘Friends of the Syrian People’ group started to 
channel their funds through new units directly 
dependent on the newly-established SOC, with 
the aim of strengthening and legitimizing the new 
political body that has been recognized as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
By the beginning of 2013, direct foreign aid to 
the local councils had significantly decreased, but 
the councils started to be the main beneficiaries 
of training and capacity-building programmes 
mostly provided by American organizations. 
Later, some Western donor countries also created 
‘semi-independent’ units, such as the Free Syrian 
Police and the White Helmets to provide security 
and civil defence services, and they empowered 
these newly-established service provision units 
to work independently of both the local councils 
and the Syrian Interim Government of the SOC 
(established in November 2013). 
Towards the end of 2013, when donor countries 
started to realise the shortcomings of the SOC 
and its units in delivering basic services through 
local councils inside Syria, they started once more 
to support the local councils directly in order 
to implement a huge number of projects such 
as food security, washing, electricity and waste 
management (mainly funded by US and UK 
agencies). However, the local councils have always 
lacked the financial and technical support needed 
for them to set up their own public policies in their 
respective territories and to develop autonomous 
and sustainable strategies based on internal 
resources. As the needs of the local communities 
increased, the ability of the local councils to 
impose themselves as the sole entities in charge 
of managing and administering their respective 
areas was also challenged by armed groups and 
NGOs (see below). Finally, with the surge of IS 
since mid-2014, the local councils have suffered 
from the new emerging priorities adopted by their 
main donor countries, which shifted to focusing 
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on fighting terrorism rather than maintaining 
strong support for the local opposition actors. 
A target for the regime, the 
Islamic State and the Kurdish 
forces
At another level, even though local councils 
were established to fill the void left by the State, 
the regime’s withdrawal was not complete. 
Since the first days of the uprising, keeping state 
institutions running seemed to be a key priority 
for the regime, which was keen on claiming and 
demonstrating that the Syrian state remained the 
irreplaceable provider of essential public services.7 
Therefore, the central government has maintained 
its presence in opposition-controlled areas by 
paying salaries to teachers, public employees and 
civil servants, and by preserving its monopoly 
over the provision of official documents. More 
empirical data are required in order to map more 
accurately the geographical areas where the state is 
still present and in which sectors. Nevertheless, in 
general the regime’s policy has been characterized 
by a discriminatory approach whereby salaries are 
not paid to those alleged to be active members 
of the opposition, such as people who work for 
the local councils. Moreover, the regime has also 
played on the traditional rivalry between cities, 
securing services for some while suspending them 
from others. 
On the other hand, the Syrian regime has 
deliberately attacked and targeted, both by 
bombing8 and/or besieging, cities in which the 
local councils were considered the most successful 
(Daraya, Douma, Maarat al Nouman and  Aleppo 
city, to name a few). This intentional targeting of 
all kinds of public facility in the liberated areas, 
which has also been Russia’s systematic approach 
during the six last months, reveals the extent to 
7 Kheder Khaddour, “The Assad Regime’s Hold on the Syrian 
State”, Carnegie Middle East Center, July 2015.
8 ‘Control’ of territories by opposition groups has always been 
partial since to date the opposition forces have never been able 
to have control over, or even neutralize, air space. Moreover, the 
fact that the opposition-held areas have never had geographical 
continuity can be seen as a result of the military strategy of the 
regime. 
which these local administrations which broke the 
state monopoly in providing public services have 
been perceived as a major threat to the regime’s 
legitimacy. Even though some local councils 
have survived these attacks and sieges, they have, 
however, been compelled to adopt a survival 
strategy in territories hollowed of their population 
(for instance, there is no more than 10 % of the 
initial population in some besieged cities). More 
broadly, it should be noted that approximately 
45-50% percent of the Syrian population 
currently in Syria live in regime-controlled areas.9 
Many civilians, among them supporters of the 
revolution, have fled from opposition-held areas 
to regime-controlled ones in search of safety and 
public services. The huge internal displacements 
caused by the conflict have put the regime under 
economic and social pressure, but conversely have 
also weakened the revolutionary and opposition 
forces (including local councils), which rely on 
popular support in their struggle against Assad.10
Finally, the increasing power of actors with 
projects competing against the mainstream 
opposition (IS since the end of 2013 and then 
the Kurdish YPG – People’s Protection Units – 
since the battle of Kobane in late 2014 have both 
succeeded to some extent in territorializing their 
respective political projects) has been built and 
developed at the expense of the various opposition 
groups. The takeover of some areas by IS and the 
Kurdish forces has undermined the work of the 
local councils. In the governorates of Raqqa and 
Deir-az-Zor (which counted very few operational 
LCs), some parts of Hassakeh and East Aleppo, IS 
opposed local councils by arresting some of their 
members and even dissolved them at a later stage to 
9 While it is difficult to present accurate data, given the shifting 
situation and the considerable internal displacement, it is esti-
mated that much of the population from the Aleppo and Idlib 
governorates is living in the coastal area, whereas many civilians 
from the rebel countryside area around Damascus have fled to 
the centre of Damascus. 
10 While IDPs are often underrepresented on local councils, a few 
councils deliver humanitarian aid to local IDPs. 
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establish its own governance structures instead.11 
Consequently, most LC members have relocated 
internally (for example the local council of Minbij 
has established its headquarters in the city of 
Azzaz) or in neighbouring countries (mainly in 
Turkey). For their part, the YPG authorities have 
established their own administrative structures 
(Kurdish self-administration) in the three main 
cantons of Afreen, Kobani and al-Jazeera.12 In 
some cities captured by the Kurdish forces, such 
as Tal Abyad, the YPG authorities have prevented 
former LC members from returning to their towns 
after their liberation from IS and have established 
alternative governing structures named ‘the 
council of notables and the municipality.’ 
As a result of military developments and Russia’s 
aerial military intervention mainly against 
territories controlled by opposition forces, 
the opposition-controlled areas shrank from 
approximately 40% of the Syrian territory at the 
end of 2012 to roughly between 13% and 15% 
in February 2016 (Jabhat al-Nusra-held areas 
included). Consequently, the number of local 
councils has also declined, and it was estimated 
in March 2016 that there were around 395 active 
councils, most of them located in the two largest 
liberated areas that have direct access to Turkey, 
the Aleppo and Idlib governorates.13 
11 See, for instance, “Civilian Life in the areas controlled by the Is-
lamic State in Syria”, Orient Research Center, March 2015; and 
the research on “The Military and Administrative Structures of 
IS” (in Arabic), published by Ain al-Medina (a Syrian on-line 
opposition newspaper), May 2015.
12 D. Darwiche, “Local Governance under the Democratic Au-
tonomous Administration of Rojava”, in this e-book.
13 According to the latest estimates provided by the Local Ad-
ministration Council Unit (Skype interview with the author in 
March 2016), the estimated 395 valid local councils in the op-
position-held areas count 6136 local council members and they 
are distributed as follows: 113 LCs in Aleppo (1850 members), 
112 LCs in Idlib (1700 members), 45 LCs in Rif Damascus (892 
members), 40 LCs in Homs (380 members), 35 LCs in Hama 
(664 members), 35 LCs in Daraa (523 members), 6 LCs affili-
ated with the Kurdish National Council (KNC) in Hassakeh (32 
members), 6 LCs in Lattakia (50 members), 3 LCs in Qunaitra 
(35 members) and 10 local council members in Damascus.
CENTRALIZED ATTEMPTS TO 
CONTROL A FRAGMENTED LOCAL 
REALITY
While the local councils have been perceived as an 
existentialist threat to the regime, they have also 
been considered a crucial stake for the opposition 
national structures in exile. The relationship 
between the local and central representatives 
of the opposition has effectively been subject to 
a twofold logic: representing the local councils 
within the SOC, and rationalizing and developing 
a centralized framework serving as an umbrella 
for the local councils. The second issue emerged 
with the establishment of the Syrian Interim 
Government (SIG) in Gaziantep. Among the 
several political groups or blocs within the SOC, 
some were more interested in the empowerment 
of the local councils, such as the Sabbagh political 
group (supported by Qatar)14 and the Muslim 
Brothers, whereas other groups such as the Jarba 
bloc and its allies (supported by Saudi Arabia) 
have instead been reluctant to move forward in 
supporting the local councils. 
The issue of political 
representation
The idea of integrating the local councils within 
the Syrian National Council was raised as soon 
as June 2012, but their representation only came 
with the establishment of the SOC. Several studies 
have highlighted the fact that the SOC’s interest 
in integrating local councils within its structures 
was an attempt to overcome the lack of legitimacy 
of the previous political body (the SNC). This 
argument was based on the fact that none of the 
SNC members were elected but rather co-opted, 
while the assumption was that local council 
members were elected. In fact, the majority 
of local councils (over 55%) did not emerge 
through elections but were established by ‘elite 
self-selection’ mechanisms (i.e. a group of leaders 
14 M. Sabbagh is the head of the Syrian Businessmen’s Forum and 
he was elected as the first Secretary General of the SOC in No-
vember 2012.
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including rebel fighters, notables, tribes, families, 
and revolutionary activists agree to share the local 
council seats among themselves by consensus 
without elections).15 
Moreover, the local council representatives within 
the SOC were selected based on a top-down 
mechanism. What was known as the ‘local council 
bloc,’ the second largest bloc in the SOC at the time 
of its creation, was made up of 14 provincial council 
representatives – 12 of them were previously 
nominated as heads of provincial councils and 
were close to M. Sabbagh. Most of these first 
provincial councils were not founded following 
a bottom-up approach (with the exception of the 
Aleppo Transitional Revolutionary Council), and 
in some cases they did not even have any presence 
in the field at the time. Nevertheless, the SOC 
chose to channel its funds to the local councils 
through these provincial councils, which has 
generated much tension between provincial and 
local councils in many areas.
Despite the fact that all the provincial council 
representatives lost their positions in their 
respective governorates following new elections 
after 2013 (local and provincial councils should 
be renewed every six months, like the executive 
bodies of the SOC), they have remained 
‘representatives of local councils’ within the SOC 
until today. Indeed, the SOC only once enlarged 
the number of its members in May 2013 (from 63 
to 114) but it never renewed them. Consequently, 
the new local councils that have been elected or 
recreated by consensus after this time have not 
been involved in the political decision-making 
process of the opposition. In the last two years, 
some local council members have demanded the 
replacement of the so-called ‘representatives of 
local councils’ within the SOC but their voices have 
gone unheard. Notably, since 2014 representatives 
of the local councils have been excluded from most 
of the initiatives seeking to unify the opposition 
forces in attempts to relaunch peace talks (such 
15 Only 36% of the councils are formed through community nom-
inations with a closed self-election process through an ad-hoc 
electoral body. 5% result from individual initiatives by activists 
and 4% are appointed by the military forces. “Local Councils of 
Syria Indicator needs”, ibid.
as the Riyad conference in December 2015) and 
from all diplomatic consultations (Geneva 2 and 
Geneva 3). In a reaction to this marginalization, 
some local councils created the Supreme Council 
of Provincial Councils in December 2015 in order 
to voice their demands in political and diplomatic 
arenas. 
The question of local governance 
as seen in the light of the SOC
Soon after its establishment, the SOC created 
many structures in Turkey dedicated to assisting 
local councils: the Assistance Coordinating Unit 
(ACU), which aimed to deliver humanitarian 
aid inside Syria (December 2012); the Local 
Administration Council Unit (LACU), which was 
supposed to help standardise the local councils 
under a unified framework (March 2013); 
and with the formation of the Syrian Interim 
Government (November 2013) its ‘Ministry of 
Local Administration, Refugees and Humanitarian 
Relief ’ created the General Directorate for Local 
Councils (March 2014). All these units were 
politicized and polarized according to personal 
interests and partisan agendas, and were backed 
by rival regional sponsors (mainly the KSA 
and Qatar). At the height of regional rivalries 
in 2013 and 2014 these structures therefore 
mostly worked in competition with each other, 
seeking to secure their presence and impose their 
influence on local councils inside Syria through 
financial support. These internal conflicts delayed 
efforts to consolidate the local councils under 
a standardized administrative structure, which 
would only be developed at a later stage (when a 
single homogenous group took over the direction 
of all the units at the end of 2014). 
It is worth noting that the local council framework 
has been perceived by the Syrian opposition and 
Western countries friendly to it as a practical 
step to obtaining a decentralized administration 
system in the country in the post-Assad era. 
Although the bylaws of the LCs differ from one 
location to another, most of the local councils 
were formed according to the administrative 
divisions provided for by a governmental decree 
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(decree 107) promulgated by Bachar al-Assad in 
August 2011.16 Moreover, the ministry of local 
administration of the SIG has adopted the same 
law (after dropping specific articles that referred 
to the regime), and it has been trying to impose 
it on the local councils as the main administrative 
law.
COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 
WITH THE OTHER LOCAL POWERS 
Despite the continuous challenges – both external 
and internal –  facing the local councils on the 
ground, they remain a necessary engine to secure 
everyday services or at least to continue to fulfil 
certain tasks. As mentioned, they are one among 
many other actors who operate on the ground to 
provide public services.17 In general, their role 
has turned out to be more that of coordinators 
or intermediaries (in particular in civil defence, 
education, health and development projects) 
rather than direct implementers (which is more 
the case in supplying water, electricity, bread and 
street cleaning). They operate on a local scale and 
coordination of municipal services at a regional 
level is uncommon (the experience of the United 
Service Offices in East Ghouta in Damascus is 
an exception). Furthermore, the effectiveness 
of the local councils is highly dependent on the 
local context, in particular on their location (the 
local councils in Idlib and Aleppo provinces with 
direct access to Turkey are more efficient than 
elsewhere, whereas those in the south remain weak 
because of Jordan’s unfriendly policy towards the 
development of local administrative structures 
near its borders). Their efficiency also depends on 
their relationship with armed groups and civilian 
organizations that operate in the same area.
16 The decree has not been implemented, but it provides for a 
decentralized organization of the administrative divisions and 
grants them new prerogatives.
17 A main difficulty in providing a clear understanding of the local 
dynamics in opposition-held areas is that the local actors who 
attempt to administer these territories are diversified and are 
subject to a very rapid generational turnover, to the extent that 
some emerge and disappear very quickly. 
The relationship with local 
NGOs18: from competition to 
coordination
Until recently, the relationship between local 
councils and Syrian NGOs was characterized by 
competition. A large number of NGOs have their 
headquarters in neighbouring countries, where 
they are registered and enjoy direct access to 
donors. At first, these local NGOs were competing 
with each other to act as implementers of INGO 
and UN agency programmes inside Syria. They 
then gradually succeeded in becoming the direct 
beneficiaries of some pooled funds, such as the 
Humanitarian Pooled Fund (HPF) managed 
by OCHA in Gaziantep, which is available to 
Syrian NGOs but not to the local councils, which 
are perceived by the UN agencies as a ‘political 
structure of the opposition.’ As a result, most of the 
local NGOs have imposed themselves as the de facto 
actors in humanitarian aid distribution and field 
hospital management while the local councils have 
concentrated more on maintaining and repairing 
local infrastructure. Until 2014, few Syrian NGOs 
were concerned about the necessity of cooperating 
with the local councils as a way of promoting ‘state-
building.’ However, new dynamics of cooperation 
have emerged during the last two years. The 
shrinking of financial and human resources and 
the increasing military pressure together with 
the failure of the SIG to deliver aid inside Syria 
have led to a rapprochement between the local 
actors operating on the ground. This cooperation 
has also been stimulated by some Anglo-Saxon 
donors. For instance, since 2014 the ‘Tamkeen 
program’ funded by the UK has provided small 
grants to implement infrastructure and public 
service projects at the local level by associating 
local councils, civil society organizations and 
local communities in several localities in the 
north and the south of Syria. At the regional 
level, for example in Idlib, informal coordination 
(including all the NGOs, the provincial council of 
18 A recent study lists 802 active civil society entities (including 
relief, media, civil and advocacy groups, both inside Syria and 
abroad). “Mapping civil society in Syria”, Citizens for Syria, No-
vember 2015, https://citizensforsyria.org/presentation-of-the-
mapping-results/. 
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Idlib, the local councils in the governorate and the 
Health Directorate and Civil Defence Directorate) 
has also seen the light. This covered the health and 
civil defence emergencies in April 2015 when the 
regime bombed all the public infrastructure inside 
the city and the countryside. Another example of 
coordination between local councils and Syrian 
CSOs has been observed in the justice sector: 
many civil documentation centres and courts 
of arbitration have been established by the Free 
Syrian Lawyers Association in close coordination 
with the local councils in opposition-held areas. 
The relationship with armed 
groups: from protection to 
competition
Military groups often have a strong influence on 
the local councils, but the nature of the relationship 
depends on several factors. In some places, the 
armed opposition has sometimes cooperated with 
local councils, and in others it has developed its 
own competing administrative structures.
At the very beginning of the conflict, armed 
groups encouraged and endorsed the creation of 
local councils. At this point the armed groups were 
largely composed of local fighters, native from the 
locality just liberated, and they predominantly 
relied on the support of the local community. 
In many locations, members of local councils 
and brigades shared similar social backgrounds 
and trajectories, which facilitated and led to 
close cooperation and harmony between the two 
groups. The city of Daraya offers a rare example 
where armed groups are fully integrated in the 
local council and fall directly under its authority. 
In cities such as Saraqib and some neighbourhoods 
of Aleppo, some Free Syrian Army brigades have 
fulfilled the task of protecting local councils from 
criminal elements, predatory bands and extremist 
groups that attempted to impose their control over 
these areas. More broadly, most FSA brigades have 
not attempted to publicly take control over local 
councils by force. 
With the intensification of the conflict, increasing 
access to funding and weapons for armed groups 
has encouraged them to set up their own local 
governance structures. This was particularly the 
case at the end of 2012 with the advent of Islamist-
nationalist armed groups, which constitute the 
bulk of the mainstream opposition (Ahrar al Cham, 
The Army of Islam, the Syrian Islamic Liberation 
Front and the Islamic Front, to name a few). These 
have developed their own governance structures 
known as Islamic committees or Shura councils 
(majalis al shura). These structures aimed to act 
as municipal administrations, and were hence 
in direct competition with the city councils and 
governorates.19 This competition has been taking 
place in three main essential sectors: the supply of 
bread – a crucial means of gaining popularity and 
generating income, justice and police 
Throughout the conflict, the dynamics of 
competition or confrontation have, however, 
been reduced by mutual interests. On the one 
hand, the opening of a second military front 
against IS early in 2014 relegated to second rank 
the ambitions of the armed groups to manage the 
population. Moreover, the aim of armed groups 
to dominate local administration has sometimes 
been confronted with popular dissent due to bad 
management, corruption, and a lack of expertise. 
By the end of 2015, a few armed groups had 
maintained their own administrative structures 
in the north of Syria, such as the ‘Public Services 
Administration’ of Jabhat al Nusra (JaN), which is 
operating in some areas of Idlib and Aleppo (but 
this body does not have a uniform presence in all 
the territories where JaN has a strong presence and 
the al Qaeda-affiliated group continues to allow 
the other local councils to operate),20 the ‘Civil 
Islamic Commission for the administration of the 
liberated areas,’ mainly linked to Ahrar al Sham 
19 Frantz Glasman, op.cit.
20 In eastern Aleppo city, the public services administration (PSA) 
and the Aleppo city local council are the main municipal ser-
vice providers and their relationship seems competitive and 
sometimes tense. The LC is reportedly a larger entity and plays 
a dominant role in sanitation services, in maintaining water 
pipes, and at times electrical wires. The PSA is a smaller body 
which controls key points in Aleppo City’s electricity grid and 
water network, giving it an outsized role in the maintenance of 
these services, electricity in particular. It also plays a key role in 
the provision of flour to Aleppo’s bakeries. 
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and still active in some parts of Idlib province,21 
and the Zanqi brigade, which continues to 
provide a considerable range of public services 
in the western countryside of Aleppo. Other 
armed groups have, however, relinquished their 
ambitions to govern local structures (such as 
The Army of Islam in Douma, for instance). 
Nevertheless, the influence of the armed groups 
remains strong as they sometimes nominate their 
own representatives on the local councils (such as 
in the city of Idlib in 2015).
On the other hand, local councils have no 
interest in adopting a confrontational approach 
towards the brigades as they do not have the 
means to provide security. In order to continue 
their work on the ground and to consolidate 
their fragile local power they needed to establish 
a healthy working relationship both with the 
armed opposition and civil society organizations. 
This healthy relationship has been cemented on 
previously existing personal networks such as 
tribal affiliations, solidarity between neighbours, 
friendship, and families. The daily and shared 
experience of the war has also contributed to 
forging new solidarity between civil and military 
groups.
In the light of the war fatigue that has drained 
both military and civil groups, a self-imposed 
mutual understanding has gained momentum and 
power over the previously-dominant dynamics of 
competition between armed groups, civil activists 
and local councils. The cessation of hostilities 
– partially respected during the first month of 
its implementation – could be an opportunity 
to redefine the respective roles of the local 
councils and the armed groups, by strengthening 
and empowering the councils to manage and 
administer their localities, as is currently being 
discussed in some opposition circles.
21 This Commission is still in its formative stage, but it has been 
reported that it is outperforming in Idlib province, in particu-
lar in support of IDPs. Idlib currently constitutes a key area of 
competition between local councils, armed groups and NGOs 
in areas close to the Turkish border.
CONCLUSION
Like that of the conflict in which it is inscribed, the 
trajectory of local councils has never been linear. 
Even after five years of conflict that has caused 
widespread destruction, local councils, and 
more broadly networks of civil activists, remain 
embroiled in the struggle to create alternatives 
to the authoritarian practices of both the regime 
and extremist groups. Today geographically 
concentrated in the two strongholds of the 
opposition, Aleppo and Idlib, local councils 
chiefly draw their legitimacy from the services 
that they are still able to provide to impoverished 
local communities and from their daily interaction 
with them. Nevertheless, these councils have 
gradually been weakened, firstly by the systematic 
destruction policies adopted and implemented 
by the regime and its allies (which have to some 
extent achieved their main goal, that no state-
like actors or governance structures should arise 
in the liberated territories) and then by Islamic 
State. At a second level, they have also suffered 
from the absence of a long-term coordinated 
donor strategy, from the internal political rivalry 
between opposition groups, and even from their 
ambivalent collaborative or competitive relations 
with armed groups. Their gradual marginalization, 
exacerbated by a dominant understanding of 
Syria focused only on war, whether civil war 
or by proxy,22 has nourished various forms of 
radicalization and extremism.
The marginalization of local civil actors today 
presents a major risk for the future of Syria, 
specifically within the context of the two major 
aspects of the Syrian question as seen at this stage 
by the international community: the endeavour to 
find a political solution and the struggle against 
IS. On the one hand, sidelining these groups from 
22 As noticed by Ghaleb Attrache, the struggle of individuals, or-
ganizations and civil activist networks for change “is actively 
erased when we speak only of civil war. Such an erasure, it 
should be noted, is not merely (or never only) discursive or 
symbolic; quite significantly, it helps reproduce these actors’ 
marginalization from the current political process and perhaps 
also any future settlement and reconstruction phase”, Ghaleb 
Attrache, “The Perils and Promise of Wartime Analysis: Lessons 
from Syria”, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, March 2016. 
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the debates and negotiations that aim to define 
the framework of a political solution for the 
Syria of tomorrow could eventually undermine 
the foundations of a potential acceptable and 
lasting solution by and for all Syrians, especially 
because any potential agreement on a political 
transition will, in the end, be applied by the local 
actors present on the ground, and particularly if 
the regime is forced to make some concessions 
in favour of a decentralized system. On the other 
hand, the struggle against IS, which cannot only 
be strictly approached from a military angle, again 
poses the question that has already been addressed 
since 2014: who are the actors that can replace 
terrorist organizations wherever and whenever 
they lose control over certain territories?
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LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
UNDER THE DEMOCRATIC 
AUTONOMOUS 
ADMINISTRATION OF 
ROJAVA
DARYOUS ALDARWISH
INTRODUCTION
If some parts of the Kurdish community were 
involved in the Syrian revolution at its beginning 
in 2011, the disengagement of the Syrian army 
from the Kurdish areas in the mid of 2012 and the 
gradual takeover of these areas by the Democratic 
Union Party (DYP) put an end to the protestations 
against the Syrian regime. Then the Democratic 
Society Movement (TEV-DEM, which is a 
coalition of civil organizations and political 
parties, but in fact strictly controlled by the PYD), 
began to impose Kurdish rule over the Kurdish 
regions. On 12 July 2012, TEV-DEM and its 
affiliates reached an agreement with the Kurdish 
National Council (KNC) to establish the Kurdish 
Supreme Committee. This took responsibility 
for several aspects of administration, including 
establishing the Asayish (local police forces) 
and the YPG (local military), in addition to 
supporting locals with humanitarian aid. The 
Kurdish Supreme Committee did not last for 
long as the KNC withdrew from it in August 
2013. Therefore, TEV-DEM took full control of 
the committee, to later abandon it and establish 
the Democratic Autonomous Administration 
Source: Information Unit of Orient Policy Center, May 25, 2016
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(DAA), which is continued to the present day 
and lately started preparing itself to establish a 
federal system exclusively in the areas under the 
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while avoiding 
declaring itself as an independent state or as a 
federal state. 
Nowadays, the DAA rules most of the regions 
where Kurds have a significant presence in 
the northern and north-eastern parts of Syria 
which were always governed by non-Kurdish 
actors. These regions now are named Rojava. 
This chapter will analyse the local governance of 
the DAA, particularly in Qamishli and Jazeera 
Canton. It aims to explain how and to what extent 
the Democratic Autonomous Administration 
has succeeded in imposing Kurdish control 
over the Kurdish areas. This process has been 
largely determined by the competition within the 
Kurdish arena, by the intervention of regional and 
international actors and by the relationship of the 
new Kurdish administration with the multi-ethnic 
local community
Understanding the project of the DAA and the 
dynamics of its local governance structures in 
Rojava will help in understanding one of several 
administrations ruling in Syria, it may also help in 
determining the sustainability of this project inside 
Rojava (which is not only affected by the success 
or failure of the administration itself, but by the 
international and local powers agreements) and 
the ability of copying this project outside Rojava 
as the last statement of the Syrian Democratic 
Council (SDC) says.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMOUS 
ADMINISTRATION
Benefiting from the security vacuum created 
in Syria after the outbreak of the civil war and 
responding to Kurdish demands for autonomy, 
the Democratic Autonomous Administration 
was officially established on 21 January 2014. 
This was a single effort by TEV-DEM, which is 
an umbrella organization grouping the PYD and 
other organizations focused on issues such as civil 
society, gender, youth and creating a parliament 
(Western Kurdistan People’s Council).
The establishment of the DAA took place in very 
complicated circumstances and resulted from a 
very strong desire of TEV-DEM to seize power 
alone. Once it fully controlled the Kurdish Supreme 
Committee after the KNC had withdrawn from it 
in August 2013 due to disagreements mainly about 
the killing of demonstrators in Amuda in June 
2013, TEV-DEM continued to evade partnership 
with the KNC. However, in the second Erbil 
agreement in December 2013, the KNC and the 
People’s Council of Western Kurdistan (a TEV-
DEM affiliate) agreed to run the Simalka border 
crossing jointly. Later, in February 2014, the KNC 
staff in Simalka stopped working because TEV-
DEM made them choose between agreeing to 
work as DAA employees or leave their posts.
As it passed through these events, the 
administration in the Kurdish region slowly 
built up its structure. It had basically started as 
an administration concerned with security and 
mainly focused on possible political competition 
and protection of the Kurdish regions from attacks 
by Islamic forces. Later, by the time the DAA 
was announced, its structure as a government 
was roughly complete. It had its own legislative 
council, executive council and presidency, and its 
own judicial power (People’s courts). Moreover, 
the YPG and Asayish changed allegiance from the 
Kurdish Supreme Committee to the DAA.
One of the key institutions of the DAA is the 
commune, whose role is to deliver humanitarian 
aid to the residents in their neighbourhoods. 
Although these communes did not previously 
have a notable role, later they started distributing 
consumable items which were in short supply 
in Jazeera canton. They have recently started 
distributing sugar, which was unavailable in the 
markets, and are covering shortages of cooking 
gas cylinders and other materials.
This system of aid delivered via the communes 
has received criticism from local observers. A 
Kurdish activist and journalist who refused to give 
INSIDE WARS.  
Local Dynamics of Conflicts in Syria and Libya18
his name claims that the aid delivered through 
the commune system is not provided exclusively 
by the DAA but mostly by local NGOs, which 
are obliged to go through the commune system 
(or other DAA institutions) to be able to work in 
these regions. He adds that the authorities impose 
distribution lists on the NGOs according to the 
wishes of influential officials, and that “the NGOs 
face frequent obstruction of their distribution 
plans for months until a compromise is reached, 
which encourages corruption and favouritism 
in the DAA, as much of this aid (basically food 
baskets) is given as bribes to facilitate its work.”
Most of the current institutions of the DAA were 
previously partisan organizations affiliated with 
TEV-DEM. Some of them are still under the direct 
control of TEV-DEM, which still has the power 
to assign the key leaders. The DAA Legislative 
Council, which replaced the former People’s 
Council of Western Kurdistan, is one example 
of this, as it lacks any pretence of an opposition 
and only consists of parties affiliated, directly or 
indirectly, with TEV-DEM.
This is also the case of the YPG. The Social 
Contract of Rojava, which serves as a constitution, 
does not make it clear how the leaders of the YPG 
should be appointed and neither does it clarify 
to which constitutional institution it is affiliated, 
which leaves the door wide open for TEV-DEM, 
as the founder of the YPG, to exert direct control 
in appointing the entire command structure of 
the YPG, also giving it direct control of the YPG’s 
political positions.
Other institutions act as strong arms of TEV-
DEM but under the guise of the DAA. Foremost 
of these is the Committee of Martyr’s Families. 
Even though it is a committee within the executive 
council of the DAA, it has much unconstitutional 
influence over the Asayish and the People’s Courts. 
It has deported a journalist working with Rudaw, 
Peshewa Bahlawi, to Iraqi Kurdistan and forced 
several political activists to leave Rojava with 
threats, while the DAA closed its eyes to these 
unconstitutional acts.
The commune system is also playing a significant 
role in empowering TEV-DEM’s control over 
DAA, as Majid Mohammad, a Kurdish journalist 
and activist, says: “The role assigned to communes 
can be summarized in the aim of the DAA, and 
consequently TEV-DEM, to establish popular 
support for their project. As a greater role for the 
communes is at the expense of DAA’s institutions, 
and it is an attempt to ideologically attach locals 
to the DAA and TEV-DEM, as well as to amplify 
its regulatory systems to cover the daily life of 
the locals, it is a clear violation of the concepts of 
administration and the mechanisms of delivering 
services of the existing authorities.”
Financially, in its 2014 public budget the DAA 
declared expenditures for that year of about 2.7 
billion SYP (7.7 million USD), and indicated that 
it was aiming to reach revenues of 5.6 billion SYP 
(16 million USD) for 2015. The DAA depends 
on oil and gas production to cover its expenses, 
and according to a report issued by Jihad Yazigi 
in 2015,1 this source provides it with revenues 
reaching 10 million USD per month.
Most of this money is being spent on the military 
operations of the YPG, so the DAA has increased 
its dependency on taxes collected by the general 
directorate of customs, and while there is no 
accurate information on the amount of this 
revenue, intense complaints about this issue can 
be found published in media outlets, including 
ones close to the DAA. Moreover, the sharing of 
revenue produced by running the Simalka border 
crossing together with the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) has been a major point of 
contention between TEV-DEM and the KNC.
THE DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMOUS 
ADMINISTRATION (DAA) PROJECT
As mentioned before, the DAA project was created 
and implemented by TEV-DEM, and the project as 
it was declared became the constitution of Rojava. 
1 J. Yaziji, “Le projet autonomiste kurde est-il économiquement 
viable en Syrie?”, http://jihadyazigi.com/2015/11/01/le-projet-
autonomiste-kurde-est-il-economiquement-viable-en-syrie/ 1 
November 2015.
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Even though the content of this constitution 
includes the main principals of human rights, civil 
peace, coexistence and gender equality alongside 
more problematic issues related to the DAA’s 
institutions, it is clear that the goals of the project 
go beyond the simple content, and probably can 
be summarized as the following:
1. To represent the very core of Kurdish 
demands for autonomy after decades of ethnic 
persecution in Syria for being Kurds.
2. To achieve a victory in the internal Kurdish 
power struggle at the Kurdish national level.
Kurd demands for autonomy in Syria were not 
created by TEV-DEM’s DAA project but have 
always been a main goal of the Kurdish people since 
the beginnings of the Kurdish political movement 
in 1957. Federalism is still the major demand of 
the KNC, which represents the traditional Kurdish 
parties.
However, although the mainstream ideology of 
TEV-DEM is not a matter of disagreement with the 
KNC, as the latter has always tried to participate in 
this administration under the condition of having 
a ‘just’ share, the DAA is continually distancing 
the KNC from participation in the administration 
by flooding almost every one of its institutions 
with ideological symbols and icons which are, by 
themselves, the most problematic issue between 
the two groups. This is in addition to TEV-DEM’s 
continual refusal to hold elections for the legislative 
and local councils, and its repeated breaking of all 
its agreements with the KNC.
Nevertheless, while TEV-DEM has practically 
refused to remove its ideological symbols from the 
DAA institutions, it agreed to remove the name 
of Kurdistan from its official usage and accepted 
the presence of independent Arab and Assyrian 
military power in the region. At the same time, 
it refused to allow the entry of the KNC military 
(Peshmerga of Rojava), which has led to more 
alienation of the KNC but simultaneously a closer 
rapprochement of other ethnicities towards the 
DAA. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
When the DAA was declared, Western countries 
stopped their support for civil society in the Kurdish 
regions and boycotted the region entirely except 
for some humanitarian aid delivered by the UN. 
This situation lasted from the beginning of 2014 
until early 2015, when a little aid recommenced 
after the international coalition against IS started 
supporting the YPG in its aim to liberate Kobani. 
Therefore, the humanitarian and civil society 
support continued after a gap of almost a year.
This military and civil support did not transform 
itself into political recognition, however. The DAA 
was not invited to the Geneva talks on Syria, and 
it was not even recognized as a legitimate power 
to rule Rojava. Neither has Rojava itself achieved 
recognition by the international community, as 
the French foreign ministry has recently declared 
that it will not recognize a DAA representative 
office in Paris.
Nevertheless, the international community’s 
support for civil society in Rojava has had a large 
impact on the situation there. The many media 
outlets started with this support have resulted in 
an expansion of the margins of liberty in Rojava, 
and many civil society organizations working 
for democracy and human rights have been 
able to take part in reducing the human rights 
abuses of the DAA, which were targeting political 
parties and civil society organizations. Especially 
crackdowns on the media became less severe in 
both quality and quantity in 2015 compared to 
2014 and before. 
International humanitarian support has also 
improved the quality of life in the region, mainly 
for the displaced people who came from areas 
under the control of IS. Most of this aid is delivered 
through NGOs, while other humanitarian aid 
offered by the DAA is delivered to internally 
displaced personness through its channels.
However, the international humanitarian aid 
is not playing a notable role in developing the 
region economically, “as the slow change from 
humanitarian support to development projects 
leads to the total dependency of the recipients on 
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these aids,” according to Piroz Perik, a Kurdish 
journalist and activist.
As for DAA relations with regional states, 
its relations with Turkey are suffering an 
unprecedented crisis, even though TEV-DEM 
has made several attempts to reduce the tension 
politically via the PYD, and the YPG has 
announced several times that it wants ‘healthy’ 
relations with Turkey. These efforts have not 
borne fruit; on the contrary, relations deteriorated 
badly as the SDF made progress in the northern 
countryside of Aleppo, and they have ended up 
with Turkey now attacking the YPG-controlled 
Minagh airport and targeting the Kurdish regions 
of Afrin with mortars and cannons.
These bad relations with Turkey are affecting the 
DAA’s ability to deliver services and build a real 
government in Rojava in two ways. First, Turkey 
is a NATO member and, compared to the DAA, it 
has a greater influence on the policies of Western 
powers, although this alliance was not able to 
prevent the USA-led international coalition from 
helping the YPG against IS contrary to Turkish 
will. Nevertheless, it is still playing a major role 
in excluding the DAA from the Geneva talks, 
and also in preventing its western allies from 
recognizing the DAA or the Kurdish people’s right 
to autonomy in Syria.
Second, Ankara has the ability to destabilize 
Rojava by mobilizing its Syrian Arab and Turkmen 
allies to attack the YPG in various regions. It did 
this when it helped in the formation of the Jazeera 
and Euphrates Front, which tried to invade 
Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Ayn) in Jazeera canton in 
November 2012. More recently, when the Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF), whose key component 
is the YPG, broke the Turkish red line to the west 
of the Euphrates to fight IS, the Turks backed the 
Islamic opposition forces, tried to invade Afrin, 
and slaughtered soldiers of the SDF.
The DAA also has tense relations with the KRG, 
which are running the risk of closing the only 
border crossing that Rojava has with the rest of the 
world. It is wasting an opportunity to enhance its 
ability to fight IS, as the KRG played a significant 
role in convincing the International Coalition to 
provide aerial support to the YPG. It is also wasting 
an opportunity to benefit from the experiences 
of the KRG in securing its regions from terrorist 
breaches, which frequently happen in Rojava. 
Most of this tension occurred after TEV-DEM’s 
continual failure to meet its obligations under 
agreements with the KNC.
LOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE DAA
Even though the DAA uses the word ‘Democratic’ 
in the names of almost all its institutions, it has 
not yet called for general elections – not even for 
its first legislative council, which served as the 
constituent assembly in which the Social Contract 
of Rojava was adopted. This is a total contravention 
of international democratic norms which expect 
more than one party to participate in the process 
of writing and adopting a constitution. Due to 
the lack of democratic mechanisms in Rojava, it 
is difficult to determine precisely the level of local 
acceptance of the DAA, which only leaves us with 
the possibility of analysing the participation of 
local forces in ruling Rojava.
In spite of the relatively large number of political 
parties participating in the DAA, it represents only 
one spectrum of the political life in Rojava, while 
the other spectrum is kept absolutely outside of 
the DAA’s orbit. Thus, we find that the KNC 
and ADO (Assyrian Democratic Organization), 
which are the main opposition to the DAA, are 
totally excluded from it, while TEV-DEM and 
its affiliated parties on the Kurdish side, and the 
Assyriac Union Party on the Assyrian side are co-
founders of the DAA.
As for the Arabs of Jazeera canton, their tribes 
are divided between supporting the DAA and 
supporting the Syrian regime. Therefore, one of 
the most powerful Arab tribal alliances in the 
region (Shammar) is a co-founder of DAA and has 
formed a major military force which is fighting 
alongside the YPG, while the other powerful 
alliance (mainly the Tayy tribe) is supporting 
the Syrian regime and has formed the National 
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Defence Army, which is a part of the Syrian Arab 
Army (the regime army).
Another factor affecting the acceptance of the 
DAA among the people of Rojava is the activity 
of civil society organizations. Almost a hundred 
organizations exist in Jazeera canton. While most 
of them are not active, others are actively raising 
awareness about issues related to human rights, 
democracy, gender, transitional justice etc. and 
according to Zuhrab Qado, who is a Kurdish 
activist and a cofounder of the SHAR organization, 
“the impact of the political disputes between 
TEV-DEM and the KNC casts a shadow over 
their (local NGOs’) activities, with some of them 
taking political positions supportive of one side, 
while the blurred approach of the DAA towards 
civil society organizations and the unclear laws 
regarding their activities are deterring them from 
efficiently responding to local needs.” 
There is also a large gap between the DAA and 
the media. This started with the DAA trying to 
impose its own agenda and terms on the media, 
like labelling other military groups as terrorists, 
and referring to YPG deaths as martyrdoms etc., 
with threats to ban journalists from work, deport 
them to Iraqi Kurdistan, or even to burn down 
the offices of media outlets which do not accept 
such conditions. These conditions had improved 
by 2014 and 2015: more media outlets could work 
in the region and media interventions by the DAA 
reached a comparatively low level. Nevertheless, it 
still keeps its main red lines intact. For example, 
expressing a significantly different political view 
to the DAA’s still means the outlet will be banned, 
as happened recently with the Rudaw and Orient 
News TV channels, which are banned from 
working in Jazeera and Kobani cantons.
CONCLUSIONS
DAA represents a genuine need of the Kurdish 
people to rule themselves, but this kind of 
representation is most likely to be a result of the 
people’s emotional attachment to this decades-
long ambition, since the ability of Kurds to 
consider that they are ‘ruling themselves’ needs 
the application of democratic measures, which is 
not happening under the current rule of the DAA. 
It would be more accurate to describe the current 
situation of DAA rule as only at least ‘non-Kurds 
are not ruling Kurds.’
Compared to other parts of Syria, the DAA has 
made much progress in terms of defusing ethnic 
and sectarian conflicts within the community of 
Rojava, and achieving the participation of almost 
all groups in its government, since religious 
considerations have been ruled out of question, 
and ethnic differences are neutralized in favour of 
increasing political acceptance.
TEV-DEM’s total control over the DAA is 
impeding it from progressing more effectively, 
despite the relationship having helped it at the 
very beginning of its formation. The continuation 
of this dependency is worsening relations with the 
KRG and Turkey, and creating obstacles to DAA 
progress.
DAA is not open to political participation and 
does not allow the opposition to participate in 
its institutions. This results in opposition to the 
DAA as a whole without being able to distinguish 
between the DAA as a Kurdish autonomous entity 
and TEV-DEM as the party ruling this entity.
The future of this administration and its federal 
system is not positive now that it is not recognised 
by neither the regime, the opposition, the regional 
powers nor the international powers.
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STATES SPONSORS AND 
THE SYRIAN INSURGENCY: 
THE LIMITS OF FOREIGN 
INFLUENCE
THOMAS PIERRET
Much of the discussion on state support for Syrian 
insurgents has been concerned with two key 
issues: first, the ultimate goals state sponsors try 
to achieve (countering Iran’s regional influence, 
weakening Kurdish nationalists in northern Syria, 
etc.); and second, the preferences of these states 
in terms of rebel partners (sympathy or hostility 
towards Islamist factions, Saudi support for 
certain groups against Qatar-backed factions, and 
vice versa). However, aspects of the problem that 
have often been overlooked are the capabilities 
of the state sponsors of the Syrian insurgency 
and their resulting ability (or lack thereof) to 
guide their insurgent partners according to their 
wishes, regardless of their virtually unlimited 
financial means.1 Compared to Iran, countries like 
the Gulf monarchies, Jordan and Turkey suffer 
from a significant disadvantage when it comes to 
supporting paramilitaries abroad due to political 
contradictions and a lack of expertise.2
One key reason for this imbalance is the non-
revolutionary nature of the state sponsors of the 
Syrian insurgency, as opposed to the revolutionary 
character of the Iranian regime. This distinction 
is not based on the respective stances of these 
states towards the 2011 Arab revolutions, but 
rather on the origins of their regimes: whereas 
the Islamic Republic of Iran is the product of the 
1979 revolution, the Gulf monarchies and Jordan 
are conservative regimes that have withstood 
1 Estimates of the amount of foreign funding for the Syrian rebels 
are purely speculative. Pro-Asad Lebanese newspaper Al-Akh-
bar has claimed that by the end of 2015 Syrian insurgents had 
received a total of $US 6 billion in external funding (al-Akhbar, 
21 March 2016, http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/254596).
2 For a rare discussion of the imbalance between the policies of 
Iran and the Gulf states in Syria in terms of capabilities, see 
Émile Hokayem, “Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil 
War”, Survival, 56/6 (2014), 59-86.
successive regional waves of revolutionary change 
since the 1950s, and Turkey’s political system is the 
outcome of a transition that has seen the gradual 
subjugation of the military to civilian power 
through (so far principally) constitutional means. 
Revolutionary states like Iran (or proto-states like 
the Islamic State) enjoy two distinct advantages 
when they engage in subversive activities abroad. 
First, revolutionary ideologies are inherently 
universal and militant, and therefore provide a 
model that is replicable by foreign insurgents. 
Whereas Iran’s non-state proxies in Lebanon and 
Iraq (Hezbollah, Badr, ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, …) are 
militias of strict Khomeynist obedience, no Syrian 
rebel faction actively promotes the establishment 
of a patrimonial monarchy of the Saudi or Qatari 
type. Certainly, the experience of the Turkish AKP 
is favourably perceived by moderate segments of 
the Syrian insurgency, but it is an inherently non-
militant model, which is possibly seen as the final 
outcome of the revolutionary process rather than 
as a blueprint for insurgent mobilisation itself. 
A corollary of the absence of a revolutionary 
ideology among the state sponsors of the Syrian 
insurgency is the prominent role of third parties, 
which could be called ‘cause entrepreneurs.’ 
Because state sponsors do not provide their own 
ideological rationale for violent mobilisation, the 
void is filled by non-state actors ranging from pro-
democracy local activists to transnational Jihadis. 
By contrast, such third parties are conspicuously 
absent from the relationship between Iran and its 
paramilitary proxies.
The second advantage of revolutionary regimes 
is the fact that their state apparatus includes an 
elite that is dedicated to relations with foreign 
paramilitaries as part of the agenda of exporting 
the revolution. Given the key role this elite played 
in the revolutionary process at home, it exerts 
sufficient influence within the state to secure 
significant resources in support of its overseas 
ambitions. Iran deals with its regional proxies 
through the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic 
Revolution (Pasdarans), a fully specialised state 
agency that has accumulated more than three 
decades of uninterrupted experience in arming, 
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training and supervising foreign paramilitaries. As 
for the state supporters of the Syrian opposition, 
they do the same through intelligence services, 
whose chief concern is domestic security, and 
they have only occasionally, if at all, engaged in 
subversion abroad.3 In other words, revolutionary 
states are able to minimise one of the main 
problems faced by state sponsors of insurgent 
groups: diverging political preferences.4 This is 
the case because revolutionary states provide their 
insurgent partners with a coherent ideological 
rationale for violent mobilisation, and because 
they possess more, and better, organisational and 
human resources to shape their proxies in their 
own image. 
Because they lack such advantages, non-
revolutionary states suffer from three main 
weaknesses in the conduct of their subversive 
strategies: first, they are heavily dependent on 
the organisational capabilities of their rebel 
partners and possess few means to improve 
these capabilities, regardless of the financial 
resources they provide;5 second, they have to 
cope with significant interference on the part of 
non-state third parties that either compete with 
state sponsors for the control of the insurgency 
(possibly, as will be shown below, by destroying the 
rebel proxies of foreign states) or mediate between 
these states and their rebel beneficiaries; and 
third, the insurgent partners of non-revolutionary 
states enjoy significant leeway to exploit rivalries 
between patron states, at least when the ideology 
of these insurgent groups makes them acceptable 
to more than one regional patron. fourth, due to 
their position in the international state system, 
non-revolutionary states are more amenable to 
3 Hokayem, “Iran, the Gulf states”, 81.
4 Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, David Cunningham, 
“Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups”, Interna-
tional Organization, /65 (2011), 709–44.
5 Here, I follow Paul Staniland’s argument that the organisational 
capabilities of insurgent groups principally stem from the pre-
war social networks upon which their leadership is built, and 
that the impact of foreign funding on those capabilities is lim-
ited. See Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion. Explaining In-
surgent Cohesion and Collapse, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
2014. 
pressures from hegemonic global powers, in this 
case the United States.
In this chapter, I will illustrate the limits of foreign 
patrons’ influence over the Syrian insurgency 
by focusing on the receiving end. I will show in 
particular that whether or not Syrian insurgent 
factions have proven successful (i.e. cohesive and 
militarily efficient) has had less to do with external 
support than with their inherent qualities or flaws. 
My focus here is thus not the performance of 
the Syrian insurgency in general, but variations 
between groups that have faced similar adverse 
circumstances over the last years: first, a significant 
imbalance between the half-hearted support they 
have received from their foreign state patrons, 
on the one hand, and the far more resolute 
involvement of Iran and Russia in the conflict 
alongside the Asad regime, on the other hand; 
second, the rise of third parties like the Islamic 
State and the Kurdish PYD, that have forced the 
rebels to fight on several fronts and transformed 
their foreign patrons’ strategies at the expense of 
the struggle against Asad.
SAUDI ARABIA: A STORY OF 
MANY FAILURES
Among the main regional sponsors of the Syrian 
rebels, Saudi Arabia had the clearest idea of the 
shape the insurgency should take, or more exactly 
should not take. Indeed, besides anti-Iranian 
geopolitical calculations and a quest for domestic 
legitimacy, it seems that Riyadh’s decision to start 
providing support to Syrian insurgents in the spring 
of 2012 was sparked by an anti-Islamist stance, 
and more specifically by the growing influence of 
factions closely tied to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and/or Qatar, such as the Committee for the 
Protection of Civilians, a Muslim Brotherhood-
related front that secured the allegiance of several 
rebel factions in central Syria from February 
2012 onwards, and that was formally allied with 
the founding figure of the Free Syrian Army, Col. 
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Riyad al-As‘ad.6 The Lebanese intermediaries first 
appointed by the Saudis to distribute aid to the 
Syrian rebels, such as Mustaqbal MP Uqab Saqr, 
were given a mandate that one of their Syrian 
interlocutors summarised as follows: “help anyone 
but the Islamists.”7
Practically, “anyone but the Islamists” translated 
into a focus on army defectors such as Gen. Mustafa 
al-Sheikh, Col. Qasim Sa‘d al-Din and Capt. Mahir 
al-Nu‘aymi and ideologically amorphous factions 
embracing the FSA label.8 One of the first rebel 
factions to benefit from Saudi largesse were the 
Faruq Battalions in Homs, an FSA flagship that 
during the first year of the insurgency was perhaps 
the most powerful and wealthiest insurgent group 
in Syria.9 Faruq’s financial resources were not 
only a consequence of Saudi support, but rather 
of the group’s ability to play on its strength and 
prestige (as a pioneering insurgent force in what 
was then the ‘capital of the revolution’) to secure 
funding from competing sources. By September 
2012, Faruq had joined the Islamic Front for the 
Liberation of Syria, a nationwide alliance funded by 
Salafi networks related to veteran Syrian ideologue 
Muhammad Surur Zayn al-‘Abidin, who publicly 
expressed his contempt for the Saudi regime and 
6 “The Free Syrian Army and the Committee for the Protec-
tion of Civilians Form a Joint Command Council” (in Ara-
bic), Middle East Panorama, 29 February 2012, http://www.
mepanorama.net/109303/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%
D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%
D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1-
% D 9 % 8 8 % D 9 % 8 7 % D 9 % 8 A % D 8 % A 6 % D 8 % A 9 -
% D 8 % A D % D 9 % 8 5 % D 8 % A 7 % D 9 % 8 A % D 8 % A 9 -
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF/.
7 Interview with a Damascene activist who participated in dis-
cussions over arms deliveries from Lebanon, Istanbul, August 
2015.
8 This pattern was clearly illustrated by the Saudi-organised de-
livery of Chinese-made HJ-8 antitank missiles in the spring of 
2013. See Thomas Pierret, “External support and the Syrian 
insurgency”, Foreign Policy, 9 August 2013, http://mideast.for-
eignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/09/external_support_and_the_
syrian_insurgency.
9 Interview with a Syrian rebel leader from Homs, Istanbul, Au-
gust 2015.
maintained close relations with Qatar.10
Besides its multiple and shifting loyalties, Faruq also 
disappointed Saudi Arabia (and its other patrons) 
with its organisational dysfunctions. The group’s 
leadership was an ad hoc collection of military 
defectors (Lt. ‘Abd al-Razzaq Tlass), civilian 
revolutionary activists (Hamza al-Shamali) and 
religious clerics (Amjad al-Bitar) that had joined 
forces after 2011. The loose character of al-Faruq’s 
command structure was further exacerbated 
when the group used its considerable purchasing 
power to expand in the north of the country, 
where it acquired even more resources and made 
itself an essential partner to Turkey by taking 
control of border crossings.11 The Northern Faruq 
Brigades were led by the controversial Nawras al-
Muhammad, a.k.a. al-brins (‘the Prince’), who was 
widely accused of large-scale exactions, and was 
later executed by the rebel court of Aleppo on that 
basis.12 In late 2012, al-Faruq started to fragment 
as a result of personal rivalries that translated 
into the dismissal of key figures like Tlass and 
al-Bitar and the creation of splinter factions like 
the Independent Faruq Battalions.13 By mid-2013, 
Faruq had become a minor faction, and within 
a year further internal disputes destroyed what 
was left of the group.14 Former Faruq leaders 
then participated in the creation of the Hazm 
10 Thomas Pierret, “Salafis at War in Syria: Logics of Fragmen-
tation and Realignment”, in Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio 
Merone (eds.), Salafism After the Arab Awakening: Contending 
with People’s Power, London, Hurst, 2016.
11 Rania Abouzeid, “Syria’s Up-and-Coming Rebels: Who Are the 
Farouq Brigades?”, Time, 5 October 2012, http://world.time.
com/2012/10/05/syrias-up-and-coming-rebels-who-are-the-
farouq-brigades-2/.
12 Interview with a Syrian analyst, Istanbul, August 2015; “Shar-
ia Court in Aleppo executes leader of Faruq Battalions in the 
North (in Arabic)”, Al-Dorar al-Shamiyya, 21 avril 2015, http://
eldorar.com/node/74664.
13 See Al Jazeera’s interview with Farouk leader Usama al-Ju-
naydi, Youtube, 17 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=IJIda5B1QHU.
14  Announcement of the dismissal of Usama al-Junaydi, Youtube, 20 
July 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rph11Qn5Fp8.
INSIDE WARS.  
Local Dynamics of Conflicts in Syria and Libya25
movement,15 a US favourite whose frailty was 
exposed when it rapidly disintegrated under the 
attacks of the Nusra Front in early 2015.16
A considerable amount of Saudi money was also 
spent on the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades, a nation-
wide alliance run by military defectors that in the 
first half of 2013 seemed able to compete with 
the largest Islamist coalitions.17 Like the Faruq 
Battalions, Ahfad al-Rasul was initially appealing 
enough to secure funding from both Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia, but also like Faruq its leadership was 
based on loose (partly tribal) networks that proved 
dysfunctional and made the alliance unable to 
resist successive onslaughts on the part of Jihadi 
rivals: in mid-2014 Islamic State destroyed Ahfad 
al-Rasul’s main strongholds in the Euphrates 
valley,18 and at the end of the same year the Nusra 
Front annihilated the northern branch of the 
Syria Revolutionaries Front, the product of an 
earlier merger between Ahfad al-Rasul and Jamal 
Ma‘ruf ’s Martyrs of Syria, another non-Islamist 
Saudi favourite.19 Having lost its main assets in 
northern Syria by early 2015, Saudi Arabia had no 
choice but to engage in a cautious rapprochement 
with Ahrar al-Sham, Qatar and Turkey’s main 
15 Jeffrey White, “Rebels Worth Supporting: Syria’s Harakat 
Hazm”, The Washington Institute Policy Watch 2244, 28 April 
2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/rebels-worth-supporting-syrias-harakat-hazm.
16 “U.S. Syria strategy falters with collapse of rebel group”, Reuters, 
5 March 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-cri-
sis-syria-hazzm-idUSKBN0M10GV20150305.
17 Nicholas Heras, “Alwiya Ahfaad ar-Rasool: A Growing Force 
in the Syrian Armed Opposition”, Fair Observer, 20 May 2013, 
http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_af-
rica/alwiya-ahfaad-ar-rasool-growing-force-syrian-armed-op-
position/. 
18 Saddam al-Jamal, a prominent commander of Ahfad al-Rasul 
in Abu Kemal, defected to IS and became its emir in the region. 
On the role of tribal ties in Ahfad al-Rasul, see Hassan, Hassan 
and Michael Weiss, IS: Inside the Army of Terror (Reagan Arts, 
2015), p. 202.
19 “The rise and ugly fall of a moderate Syrian rebel offers les-
sons for the West”, Washington Post, 5 January 2015, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-rise-and-
ugly-fall-of-a-moderate-syrian-rebel-offers-lessons-for-the-
west/2015/01/04/3889db38-80da-4974-b1ef-1886f4183624_
story.html.
Islamist ally in the area.20
Those Saudi partners that proved more resilient in 
the long term owed their relative success to factors 
other than funding from Riyadh. In the eastern 
suburbs of Damascus, the late Zahran ‘Allush’s 
Army of Islam has not only managed to survive 
a three-year siege by regime forces, but also to 
establish itself as the dominant rebel force in the 
area (sometimes through direct military action 
against rival factions like the Army of the Umma, 
that was destroyed by the Army of Islam in early 
2015), eliminate the Islamic State’s local sleeping 
cells, keep the Nusra Front in check, and expand 
nationwide. Yet the Army of Islam is hardly a 
Saudi creature. A Salafi group, and as such the 
one major exception to Riyadh’s reluctance to 
deal with Islamist factions,21 it once had Qatar-
aligned alliances (Syrian Islamic Liberation Front 
and Islamic Front) and has received support 
from Surur’s networks. The group’s connection 
with Saudi Arabia stems from long-standing ties 
between ‘Allush’s father, a Salafi scholar, and the 
Saudi religious establishment, but certain Saudi 
decision-making centres have long distrusted the 
Army of Islam. In any case, it is the cohesiveness 
of the group’s organisational structure (itself the 
result of a closely-knit pre-war semi-clandestine 
religious network) that has made it such an efficient 
and hence attractive target for various sources of 
funding rather than the other way round.22 
The other main area of Saudi influence is the 
southern province of Daraa, which is virtually 
the only place where Riyadh’s preference for 
a predominantly non-Islamist insurgency has 
prevailed and persisted in the long run. The 
20 Hassan Hassan, “Syria’s revitalized rebels make big gains in 
Assad’s heartlands”, Foreign Policy, 28 April 2015, http://for-
eignpolicy.com/2015/04/28/syrias-revitalized-rebels-make-
big-gains-in-assads-heartland/.
21 The two other main exceptions are the Front for Authenticity 
and Development (FAD), a politically moderate coalition sup-
ported by al-Turath (‘Heritage’), a quietist, Saudi-aligned Salafi 
association based in Kuwait, and the Nur al-Din Zanki move-
ment in Aleppo, which was affiliated with the FAD in 2013 but 
whose ties to Saudi Arabia rely on personal connections rather 
than on ideological affinities. 
22 Pierret, “Salafis at war in Syria”; interview with Jaysh al-Islam’s 
spokesman Islam ‘Allush, Istanbul, August 2015.
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Southern Front, a broad coalition of FSA-banner 
factions, remains by far the dominant force in 
the province with at least twenty-five thousand 
fighters as opposed to, probably, a mere four-digit 
number of Islamist rebels. This exception results 
from a combination of factors, among which is a 
tight control of rebel supply lines by the Jordanian 
authorities, whose anti-Islamist bias has been even 
more pronounced than that of Saudi Arabia.23 
In its relations with Syrian rebels, Amman has 
been advantaged by a sizeable and competent 
intelligence apparatus that is familiar with 
southern Syria’s social and cultural context due 
to geographical proximity. However, even in such 
ideal conditions there have been limits to what 
local rebels can achieve in terms of unification. 
It is remarkable that despite the absence of a 
major ideological divide among them, and their 
shared dependence on a single source of logistical 
support, Southern Front members have retained 
separate command structures and have not been 
able to move from mere coordination towards a 
full merger.24 Although Jordan might have feared 
that a more integrated Southern Front would 
become too independent of it, there seems to be 
no evidence that Amman actively discouraged 
unification moves within the alliance. Rather 
than external influence, the key variable for this 
persistent fragmentation is thus the social structure 
of the southern insurgency; that is, a collection 
of groups that are firmly entrenched within their 
local communities but whose respective leaders 
are too loosely tied together to achieve the level of 
trust required for full unification.
23 International Crisis Group, “New Approach in Southern Syria”, 
Middle East Report n° 163, 2 September 2015, http://www.
crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20
Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/163-new-approach-
in-southern-syria.pdf 
24 This situation contrasts with the findings of Ostovar and Mc-
Cants, who in 2013 identified ideological differences and mul-
tiple sources of funding as the major impediments to rebel unity 
in Syria. See Afshon Ostovar and Will McCants, “The Rebel 
Alliance. Why Syria’s Armed Opposition Has Failed to Unify”, 
CNA, Analysis and Solutions, 2013.
QATAR AND TURKEY: BETTING ON 
ALL HORSES
In 2013, Qatar provided the Syrian rebels with a 
small batch of Chinese-made, Sudan-sourced FN-6 
man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS). 
The eight different groups that benefitted from 
this gesture of generosity before deliveries were 
interrupted, probably under US pressure, spanned 
across a broad ideological spectrum including 
local Military Councils of the Western-backed 
Free Syrian Army, the Muslim Brotherhood-
affiliated Shields Committee, and the hard-line 
Salafis of Ahrar al-Sham.25 This eclecticism reflects 
a strategy that was primarily shaped by two of the 
small emirate’s key characteristics: first, in spite of 
enormous financial means, it has scarce limited 
institutional and human resources to manage 
relations with foreign paramilitaries; second, in 
contrast to other Gulf monarchies, it has a relative 
indifference to the ideological orientation of 
foreign partners because of the Al Thani family’s 
utmost confidence in the domestic stability of its 
own rule.26 
Qatar’s privileged relations with Syrian Islamist 
factions can be interpreted as a form of outsourcing, 
in the sense that these factions were brought into 
Doha’s sphere of influence by non-state third 
parties that had long maintained close ties with 
the emirate. These parties were, to put it simply, 
virtually all the regional Sunni networks that 
were on bad terms with Saudi Arabia: the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Shields Committee; the Committee 
for the Protection of Civilians, rebranded in 2014 
as the Sham Legion) and like-minded but non-
affiliated factions (Ajnad al-Sham in Damascus, 
Army of Mujahidin in Aleppo), Salafi haraki 
(‘activist’) networks connected either to Surur 
25 Other recipients of FN-6 missiles were the Ahfad al-Rasul Bri-
gades, the FSA-affiliated al-Qusayr Brigade, the Front for Au-
thenticity and Development in Aleppo, and the Syria Islamic 
Liberation Front-affiliated Fath Brigade in Aleppo. FN-6 recipi-
ents have been identified by the author thanks to videos upload-
ed by these factions to Youtube throughout 2013. 
26 Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar seized 
control of the Syrian revolution”, Financial Times, 17 May 
2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f2d9bbc8-bdbc-11e2-890a-
00144feab7de.html.
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Zayn al-‘Abidin (Syrian Islamic Liberation Front-
SILF) or to remnants of the Salafi Movement in 
Kuwait (Ahrar al-Sham’s Syrian Islamic Front, 
which merged with the SILF in late 2013 to form 
the Islamic Front), in addition to Jihadi fund 
raisers whose operations in Qatar were tolerated 
by the local authorities (Nusra Front).27
In spite of this, Qatar’s policy towards the Syrian 
insurgency has not been uniformly pro-Islamist. 
As the FN-6 episode illustrates, Doha has also 
provided support for FSA-affiliates dominated 
by military defectors. Indeed, since the emirate’s 
partnership with Islamist factions was driven less 
by ideological preference than by the brokerage 
of non-state third parties, nothing prevented 
Qatar from trying to maximise its influence by 
betting on all horses, that is, by funding both 
Islamist and ‘nationalist’ factions. In 2012 and 
2013, when FSA structures dominated by army 
defectors were established (Supreme Military 
Council, Headquarters, local Military Councils), 
Qatar worked to match Saudi influence within 
these structures, and to seize its share of what 
might then possibly become a major conduit of 
Western support for the insurgency. After this 
organisational scheme collapsed in late 2013, the 
US reorganised foreign support for ‘moderate’ 
rebel groups through the creation of two operation 
rooms, the Jordan-based Military Operations 
Command (MOC) and the Turkey-based 
Müşterek Operasyon Merkezi (MOM). Instead of 
going through a central Syrian leadership, support 
(notably in the form of US-made Saudi-sourced 
TOW antitank missiles) would now be directly 
distributed to vetted (generally non-Islamist) rebel 
factions. Qatar was on board again, even hosting 
training sessions for TOW missile users on its 
27 Pierret, “Salafis at war in Syria”. The Qatari sphere of influence 
among rebel factions was clearly illustrated by the list of signa-
tories of the Revolutionary Covenant, a moderate platform that 
was prepared at a meeting convened by Qatar in Turkey: Islamic 
Front, Sham Legion, Army of Mujahidin, Ajnad al-Sham, and 
the Furqan Brigades, an Islamist group operating in the prov-
ince of Qunaytra (Skype interview with an official from one of 
the signatory factions, May 2014).
territory.28 In the meantime, Doha continued to 
support Islamist factions and by the spring of 2015 
emerged along with Turkey as the main sponsor 
of the Army of Conquest alliance, which expelled 
regime troops from the province of Idlib.29
To sum up, Qatar’s policy of support for Syrian 
rebels was shaped by a combination of opportunities 
(the availability of non-state intermediaries) and 
constraints (rivalry with Saudi Arabia, Western 
pressure). Its utterly pragmatic strategy of wall-to-
wall support for insurgent factions allowed Doha 
to have the best of both worlds as it found itself in 
a privileged relationship with the Islamist factions 
that turned out to be the most efficient and resilient 
components of the insurgency (in particular Ahrar 
al-Sham, which continued to expand by absorbing 
other factions after it lost much of its resources 
and leadership in 2014)30 while maintaining ties 
with the more ‘respectable’ MOC/MOM affiliates. 
This was obviously the most rational course of 
action for a state that had the financial means to 
cultivate a wide array of clients and saw no reason 
to fear the spread of revolutionary ideals at home. 
Qatar’s association with such a cohesive and 
efficient faction as Ahrar al-Sham should not 
suggest that Qatari funding was the key variable 
behind their success, since Doha’s support also 
benefitted factions that proved less convincing in 
the long term. For instance, the Tawhid Brigade 
(renamed Levant Front in 2015), for instance, was 
initially an Al Jazeera-favourite and a thousands-
strong faction that played a leading role in the 
capture of the eastern part of Aleppo in July 
28 “Main rebel factions that received TOW missiles: ‘We re-
ceived them from friendly states, and were trained in their 
use in Qatar’”, Aksalser, 25 April 2014, http://www.aksalser.
com/?page=view_news&id=1d842ceddd4e5675291936be4053
1a20.
29 Hassan, “Revitalized Syrian Rebels”.
30 In the first half of 2014, Ahrar al-Sham lost its oil wells in the 
east to the Islamic State, while some of its Kuwayti financiers 
were sanctioned by the US Treasury. In September, dozens of 
the top leaders of the movement, including its general com-
mander Hassan ‘Abbud, were killed in an explosion during a 
meeting in the province of Idlib. On Ahrar al-Sham’s absorption 
of other groups, see Aron Lund, “Islamist mergers in Syria: Ah-
rar al-Sham swallows Suqour al-Sham”, Syria in Crisis, 23 March 
2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59471. 
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2012. However, following the assassination of its 
charismatic military leader ‘Abd al-Qadir Salih in 
October 2013, it gradually lost strength as a result of 
poor discipline and internal factionalism,31 which 
in turn entailed a drop in external support. Unlike 
Ahrar al-Sham, whose core leadership was built 
upon a cohesive network of Jihadi veterans, many 
of which had formerly been detained together at 
the Seydnaya prison near Damascus, Tawhid was 
a frail coalition of local groups held together by 
Salih’s charisma, by the short-lived momentum 
of crushing victories against the regime in 2012, 
and by foreign, notably Qatari, money. True, 
other foreign states (namely, Saudi Arabia and 
the United States) contributed to the weakening 
of the Tawhid Brigade/Levant Front by denying it 
access to MOM-supplied TOW missiles, thereby 
encouraging the creation of splinter factions such 
as the 1st Regiment in the spring of 2015.32 This 
pattern had also been observed the previous year 
when another Aleppine faction, the Nur al-Din 
Zanki Movement, secured TOW supplies as soon 
as it left the Army of Mujahidin, whom Saudi 
Arabia opposed for its alleged ties to the Muslim 
Brotherhood.33 Yet, it is remarkable that Ahrar 
al-Sham’s exclusion from the list of the MOM’s 
vetted recipients did not prevent its continuous 
absorption of smaller factions. It seems, therefore, 
that foreign pressures have had a detrimental 
effect on the cohesion of rebel factions when that 
cohesion was already fragile.
31 “Divisions shake the Tawhid Brigade” (in Arabic), Aksalser, 5 
July 2014, http://www.aksalser.com/?page=view_articles&id=d
edf8a71626f82bdae322177bd39c182.
32 “Ideological differences and US pressures. Al-Sharq al-Awsat 
reveals the reasons for the dissolution of the Levant Front” 
(in Arabic), Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 20 April 2015, http://aawsat.
com/home/article/340806/%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%
D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%A7%
D8%A6%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B9%
D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%-
D8%AD%D9%84%D9%91-%C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%
D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84
%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9%C2%BB-
%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8.
33 International Crisis Group, “Rigged cars and barrel bombs: 
Aleppo and the state of the Syrian war”, Middle East Report 
155, 9 September 2014, p. 23, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/
regions/middle-east-north-africa/syria-lebanon/syria/155-
rigged-cars-and-barrel-bombs-aleppo-and-the-state-of-the-
syrian-war.aspx.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
Although quantitatively significant, foreign state 
support for Syrian insurgents has only had a 
limited impact on the resilience and cohesiveness 
of its rebel beneficiaries. Once-lavishly-funded 
factions like the Faruq Battalions, Ahfad al-Rasul 
Brigades and Tawhid Brigade have disintegrated 
or dramatically weakened, while others have 
continued to thrive despite temporary losses 
of resources, like Ahrar al-Sham, or under dire 
military and logistical conditions, as in the case of 
the Army of Islam. In all cases, the independent 
variable determining the success or failure of these 
groups has not been the level of external support 
they receive, but the nature of their leadership: 
tightly knit networks of long-standing partners on 
the one hand, as opposed to loose ad hoc coalitions 
on the other hand. Likewise, the cases of Daraa and 
Aleppo show that even when foreign influence was 
exerted by or through a single hegemonic foreign 
state patron (Jordan and Turkey respectively) over 
an ideologically homogeneous insurgent scene, 
dysfunctions stemming from the fragmented 
social structure of the rebel leadership proved 
hard to overcome for foreign patrons. 
The major policy implication of the developments 
expounded above is that whatever financial 
resources state sponsors pour into their insurgent 
partners, they cannot make a rebel faction 
successful when its leadership is dysfunctional, 
nor can they lastingly impose unity on rebel groups 
against their inherent centripetal dynamics. Such 
implications were already acknowledged to some 
extent when the project for a fully integrated 
‘Free Syrian Army’ was abandoned in favour of 
the more modest MOC/MOM approach, with 
coordination replacing overambitious unity 
schemes, and support being provided directly to 
select moderate factions that had survived the 
Darwinian selection process of the war. Scaling 
down their aims of shaping a foreign insurgency is 
probably the most realistic strategy for states that 
lack both a militant ideology to export and a fully-
fledged agency designed for propping up foreign 
insurgents who embrace that ideology – that is, 
virtually all regimes except revolutionary ones.
PART 2. 
THE LIBYAN CONFLICT
Source: “Wikimedia Commons”
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DIALOGUE, MEDIATION 
AND RECONCILIATION 
IN LIBYA’S LOCAL 
CONFLICTS
VIRGINIE COLLOMBIER1
INTRODUCTION
After months of divisions and deadlock within 
the General National Congress (GNC) elected 
in July 2012 and a failure to resolve the crisis 
through the election of a new parliament (House 
of Representatives, HOR) in June 2014, the 
political transition envisioned by Libya’s National 
Transitional Council (NTC) definitively collapsed 
during Summer 2014. Two rival parliaments and 
governments, based in Tripoli and the Eastern city 
of al-Bayda, started competing for recognition and 
authority. A major political and military conflict 
1 This chapter is based on fieldwork and the participation in 
‘Social Dialogue’ meetings that were made possible thanks to 
the support of the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre 
(NOREF).
erupted and pitted national and local forces that 
became part of Libya’s two main warring alliances 
against each other: Libya Dawn (Fajr Libia) and 
Operation Dignity (Karama). 
In the Nafusa Mountains, the region located 
between the Tunisian border and Tripoli, the 
reverberation of the national conflict resulted in 
historical factional conflicts between towns and 
communities being reignited,2 the map of local 
2 For historical background on the Nafusa Mountains, the region’s 
role in the 2011 revolution and civil war, and the resurgence of 
factionalism after 2011, see Wolfram Lacher and Ahmed Lab-
nouj, “Factionalism resurgent. The War in the Jabal Nafusa”, in 
Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn, The Libyan Revolution and its 
Aftermath, Hurst, 2015, pp. 256-284.
Source: Google maps
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alliances being redrawn, and a humanitarian crisis 
that lasted for months, with hundreds of families 
displaced and communication between towns and 
cities as well as the supply of basic goods (including 
fuel and medicine) rendered extremely difficult.
In September 2014, the United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) initiated a political 
dialogue between major Libyan actors aimed 
at solving the institutional crisis at the national 
level and forming a national unity government, 
as well as at reaching an agreement between rival 
factions on confidence-building measures and a 
comprehensive ceasefire.3 Yet the question of how 
to secure the implementation and sustainability 
of such agreements at the local level appeared 
extremely challenging. Military confrontation, 
in particular, most often involved armed groups 
responding to the authority of local leaders, who 
enjoyed a high degree of operational autonomy 
from the leadership of the two main political and 
military coalitions at the national level. Overall, 
the fact that the political dialogue initially gathered 
representatives of the main factions competing 
within the political institutions but did not 
include representatives of the armed groups nor of 
other forces holding legitimacy and influence on 
the ground, such as elders and notables (because 
none were considered as political actors per se), 
would render the building of actual linkage and 
agreement between Libya’s various power levels 
(national and local) and circles (political, military, 
social) very difficult.
Shortly after the UNSMIL-brokered political 
dialogue was set on track, in some regions 
influential figures from local civil society started 
taking matters into their own hands to put an end 
to the military confrontation and the resulting 
humanitarian crisis, as these had a direct impact 
on their daily lives and therefore constituted the 
main priorities for them. They also considered they 
were capable of bringing about positive results by 
acting at the local level, despite not being able to 
exert direct influence on the political dialogue. 
In the Nafusa Mountains, where traditions and 
3 http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&ctl=D
etails&mid=6187&ItemID=1992890&language=en-US.
experiences of local mediation and conflict-
resolution in factional conflicts are well-anchored, 
the initiatives proved somewhat successful, 
confirming the widely-held view that any solution 
to the Libyan crisis has to involve local actors.4 The 
involvement of influential figures from local civil 
society (elders and notables in particular) proved 
key to the conclusion of local ceasefires, prisoner 
exchanges and the reopening of the region’s main 
communication axes for people and goods. 
However, the dialogue, mediation and 
reconciliation processes conducted in the 
Nafusa Mountains since 2015 also highlight 
the fact that the interplay between local social 
structures, national political and military forces 
and international actors in such processes is more 
complex. The mediation conducted by local elders 
and notables would probably not have been able 
to lead to the same result without the intervention 
of new actors (local, national and international) in 
the mediation process. Moreover, local initiatives 
could not have been developed this way if the 
national context had not significantly evolved as 
a result of the UN-led dialogue. What made the 
dialogue successful is precisely the fact that several 
processes undertaken simultaneously at different 
levels and by different actors combined to bring 
about positive outcomes.
THE NATIONAL CONFLICT AND 
ITS REVERBERATION IN THE 
NAFUSA MOUNTAINS
In July 2014, the election of a new House of 
Representatives (HOR) intended to replace the 
GNC and solve the legitimacy crisis that plagued 
it eventually resulted in the division of the country 
into two competing sets of institutions supported 
by rival political and military coalitions. The 
new ‘internationally-recognized parliament’ was 
established in the eastern city of Tobruk and 
formed a government led by Abdullah al-Thini, 
4 See for instance Jason Pack, “Pick-up the pieces: as the national-
level dialogue exacerbates tensions, perhaps it’s time to turn to a 
local approach”, 27 October 2015 ; “Localizing Power in Libya”, 
26 November 2013, http://www.libya-analysis.com/?s=local. 
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but more than 20 newly-elected HOR members 
(aligned with the revolutionary camp) refused to 
sit and take part in the parliament’s activities. In 
Tripoli, the GNC refused to step down and formed 
its own new government, led by Omar al-Hasi. 
The institutional crisis was coupled with increased 
military tensions between the armed groups 
supporting the two camps. The launch of Operation 
Dignity by former army general Khalifa Haftar in 
Benghazi in May 2014 had already resulted in a 
reshaping of alliances at the city level – with Ansar 
al-Sharia and other revolutionary armed groups 
now fighting side by side against Haftar and his 
local allies. However, Operation Dignity had 
repercussions far beyond Benghazi, as it triggered 
military confrontation in various places across 
Libya between the forces supporting Haftar5 and 
the forces opposing it gathered in the Libya Dawn 
coalition.6 
Libya Dawn was launched with the declared 
objective of evicting Zintan armed groups from 
the airport and other strategic locations in Tripoli.7 
Groups from Zintan and Warshafana allied with 
Operation Dignity against Libya Dawn and fought 
together in Tripoli and al-Zawiya during Summer 
2014, before being forced to withdraw from the 
city.
From late August until early October 2014, Libya 
Dawn forces advanced through the Warshafana 
area towards Zintan and the Nafusa Mountains. 
The fighting caused a humanitarian crisis, with 
indiscriminate shelling by both sides, civilian 
casualties, and at least 120,000 persons from 
Warshafana displaced.8 In October, Zintan armed 
5 Essentially tribal militias and civil volunteers from the east, 
armed groups from the cities of Zintan, Rujban and the War-
shafana region in the west.
6 Dominated by armed groups and politicians from the city of 
Misrata and including elements from the cities of Tripoli, al-Za-
wiya, Janzur, Zuwara and the Nafusa Mountains, among which 
Gharyan and Kikla.
7 Wolfram Lacher and Peter Cole, “Politics by Other Means. 
Conflicting Interests in Libya’s Security Sector”, Small Arms 
Survey, October 2014.
8 UNSMIL & OCHA, “Update on Violations of International Hu-
man Rights and Humanitarian Law during the Ongoing Vio-
lence in Libya” (revised), 23 December 2014. 
groups started shelling and besieging the cities 
of Kikla and al-Qal’a, considered supporters of 
Libya Dawn. The fighting resulted in the killing 
of 170 persons, hundreds of injured and over 
5,700 families displaced. In the following months, 
sporadic fighting continued in various parts 
of western Libya and the Nafusa Mountains as 
armed groups supporting either of the two main 
coalitions sought military advances or engaged in 
retaliatory attacks.9 
A SERIES OF INCENTIVES FOR 
LOCAL ACTORS TO ENTER INTO 
DIALOGUE
Even though most of the fighting took place in 
late 2014 and military clashes later remained 
circumscribed within a few specific areas (the 
cities of Kikla and Gharyan, the al-Watiyya 
military base, al-Aziziyya), the blockade of the 
main access roads in the Nafusa Mountains and 
the subsequent cut-off in the supply of basic goods 
and the circulation of people (especially the sick 
and injured) rendered the situation unsustainable 
for the inhabitants and local leaders of the region. 
Consensus therefore grew among the population, 
as well as among the elders and notables from 
each camp in the Nafusa Mountains, that a 
peaceful resolution of the crisis was needed. This 
constituted the first trigger for local actors to 
engage and attempt to initiate dialogue among the 
warring community leaders.
The second trigger came from significant 
developments on the political and military scene 
at the national level that were expected to have an 
impact on local forces involved in the conflict. In 
particular, the assessments of their positions by 
the three main parties to the conflict in the region 
– Zintan, Warshafana and Misrata – changed, as a 
result of a series of factors.
The nature of the UN-led political dialogue, which 
gathered members of the GNC and the HOR, and 
was progressively widened to include other key 
9 UNSMIL & OCHA, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in 
Libya”, 16 November 2015.
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political figures as well as representatives of Libya’s 
municipalities, also pushed civil society leaders 
to position themselves and make their voices 
heard. In particular, both the course of the UN-
led dialogue10 and the high pressure exerted by the 
city’s business community resulted in a significant 
change in the position of the leaders in Misrata 
(municipal council and military council). In 
January 2015, they decided to support dialogue11 
and Abu Bakr Hreish from the municipal council 
joined the UN-sponsored Geneva talks. In a 
demonstration that the UNSMIL strategy of 
fragmenting the country’s main political and 
military coalitions and promoting the formation of 
a new alliance of the ‘moderates’ from both camps 
was starting to bear fruit, individual cities and 
communities appeared increasingly convinced 
that they had to protect their own specific interests, 
irrespective of their alliances with one faction or 
the other. The municipal councils of Gharyan and 
al-Zawiya, both major forces within Libya Dawn, 
also decided to back the dialogue and participate 
in the talks.12
Misrata’s participation in the UN-led talks was 
followed by the city leadership’s decision to 
withdraw its forces from Western Libya and cease 
supporting its local allies. As a result, the latter 
became more inclined to compromise as the 
balance of forces on the ground was undergoing 
significant change.
In the rival camp, the Zintan forces were suffering 
from the state of siege they had been experiencing 
over the previous months as a result of the conflict 
10 This was precisely the objective set by UNSMIL, whose strategy 
aimed at dissociating the interests of the various forces allied 
within the Libya Dawn and Dignity operations, pushing the 
more moderate forces from both camps to form a new alliance 
which was more centrist and favourable to all their interests, 
and to distance themselves from those more radical in their re-
spective camps.
11 Misrata’s business community, in particular, exerted significant 
influence in this decision. The deterioration of the city’s image 
across the country following the 2014 military conflict with 
Zintan, and later on with forces allied to General Haftar, proved 
very detrimental to their interests, as did the overall deteriora-
tion of the security situation in the country.
12 https://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid
=3543&mid=6187&ItemID=1992895. 
with neighbouring cities and communities. In 
addition, despite the use of the Zintan airport 
for arms deliveries, the Zintan and Warshafana 
forces felt weakened militarily, the support from 
Tobruk and the Libyan National Army controlled 
by general Haftar being considered insufficient.13
Overall, these developments contributed to 
modifying the balance of power between the 
local forces in the region and, most importantly, 
to decreasing the level of support and military 
resources available to them. Since foreign actors 
displayed relatively little interest in the region 
(compared to southern Libya, for instance, where 
the interests and stakes related to natural resources 
and trafficking were much higher), the local 
forces suddenly found themselves with a greater 
incentive to compromise and enter into talks with 
their rivals.
THE LIBYAN ‘SOCIAL DIALOGUE’ 
INITIATIVE AND ITS OUTCOMES 
IN THE NAFUSA MOUNTAINS
As the daily lives of the inhabitants in the Nafusa 
Mountains had become extremely difficult, local 
civil society actors pushed for dialogue between 
the warring parties and were willing to mediate. 
These local civil society actors included traditional 
social leaders (elders, wisemen and notables) from 
the warring communities themselves (here, most 
often meaning cities, tribes or ethnic groups), and 
traditional social leaders able to mediate between 
them, who had remained neutral in the most 
recent conflicts and could therefore be seen as third 
parties. Most of these were widely-respected figures 
within their communities, had wide networks 
including a variety of actors, and were considered 
to be capable of creating wide consensus and unity 
around them. Of the more prominent elders in the 
Nafusa Mountains, most had been members of the 
Popular Social Leadership (al-qiyada al-sh’abiya) 
under the Qaddafi regime, which did not per se 
deprive them of their popularity or legitimacy 
13 The military units from Zintan and the east were to a large ex-
tent autonomous.
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after the revolution, depending, of course, on the 
stance they had taken during the events of 2011. 
The traditional social leaders now willing to 
engage in dialogue and conflict resolution at the 
local level were faced with a number of challenges, 
however. Old feuds between the communities 
and cities of the region had been reactivated and 
politicized by the recent conflict at the national 
level, making the confidence crisis between the 
communities wider. The security situation and the 
multiple checkpoints established by rival groups 
and factions on the main roads in the Nafusa 
Mountains made circulation and communication 
between the parties to the conflict extremely 
difficult, as well as that between them and neutral 
parties willing to mediate. 
Against this background, the necessity of initiating 
dialogue and a mediation process outside of the 
region and the country soon became clear, yet this 
would require logistic and financial capacities that 
were not available to the mediators, or would come 
at the expense of comprising the independence and 
apolitical nature of the mediation (if support was 
requested from local businessmen, for instance). 
Finally, it was also understood by the potential 
mediators that they lacked the capacity to conduct 
their work in a way that would fit the new nature of 
the conflict. In particular, they acknowledged the 
need to use modern communication tools and to 
establish relations with foreign and international 
parties, all skills that most of them did not have.
An answer to these challenges was found with 
the setting up of an original mediation process. 
This built on the traditional conflict-resolution 
mechanisms in the region, with elders, wisemen 
and local notables identifying neutral parties 
among themselves to engage in talks with the rival 
groups and factions in the conflict. However, it 
also differed from it in that there was direct and 
indirect participation in the process by new actors: 
young activists and international organizations, 
in particular, ended up playing a part (although 
of a different nature and scope) in a somewhat 
complex mechanism of dialogue-facilitation and 
mediation.
In January 2015, what was branded a Libyan ‘Social 
Dialogue’ was launched on the initiative of a group 
of young activists from across Libya willing to 
work together with local notables (mostly elders 
and tribal leaders) to contribute to the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. Their view was that, 
while UNSMIL was mediating between prominent 
political figures at the national level, there was also 
a need to channel the view of the ‘silent majority’ 
that the political crisis should be solved peacefully 
and a comprehensive and durable ceasefire should 
be reached. Because the depth of the political and 
security crisis did not allow for the organisation of a 
meeting involving representatives of communities 
from all across Libya inside the country, and 
because the organisation of such a meeting outside 
the country required more substantial funding, 
the group of young social activists was entrusted 
with the mission of identifying and convincing 
potential foreign partners to support the initiative. 
In contrast to traditional local mediation and 
conflict resolution mechanisms in Libya, the 
Libyan ‘Social Dialogue’ therefore brought 
together community leaders, among whom 
neutral parties were identified to play the role 
of mediators, young social activists from across 
the country partnering with the ‘traditional’ 
mediators to facilitate their mediation, bringing 
in resources that the older ‘traditional’ mediators 
did not possess, and a foreign organization14 
which agreed to provide light support (meaning 
financial and logistic, but without intervention in 
the choice of participants in the dialogue nor the 
setting of the agenda) to the Libyan facilitators and 
mediators. They also insisted that representatives 
of the international community, chief among 
which were representatives of UNSMIL, attend the 
meeting as observers so as to provide additional 
legitimacy – both international and domestic – to 
14 Support for the initiative was provided by the Norwegian Peace-
building Resource Centre (NOREF). This was welcomed by the 
Libyan parties as Norway was seen as neutral in the conflict and 
NOREF agreed to back the initiative and respected and encour-
aged ownership of the initiative by the local facilitators and me-
diators.
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their initiative and its expected outcomes.15 
The first meeting of the Libyan ‘Social Dialogue’ 
was organized in Tunis and gathered around 40 
Libyan community leaders from different cities 
and tribes across the country with no political 
affiliation but a commitment to re-establishing 
dialogue between the communities in the conflict.16 
In doing this, their intention was twofold: to 
encourage the UN-led political process and give it 
more weight by making it clear that the initiative 
enjoyed grassroots support; and to put pressure 
on the Libyan political figures participating in the 
dialogue by highlighting that their constituencies 
favoured a negotiated solution and strongly 
opposed the continuation of violence.17 
The meeting was a success in that it allowed for the 
re-establishment of contacts and communication 
between influential community leaders from 
across the country. In the final joint statement of 
the meeting, the participants came out publically 
in support of dialogue and a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict. Preliminary agreements about 
the release of prisoners were also made between 
representatives from western Libya, specifically 
between Zintan and al-Zawiya, and Gharyan and 
Zintan. These directly facilitated several prisoner 
exchanges in the Nafusa Mountains in the 
following weeks, in particular a prisoner exchange 
mediated by elders from the city of al-Asaba’18 
between Zintan, Warshafana and Gharyan in late 
January 2015. 
15 By doing so, they also highlighted the influence that foreign ac-
tors have acquired on Libyan actors (be they political, military 
or social leaders) and how foreign recognition (in addition to 
financial or military support) has become a key determinant for 
domestic actors to gain prominence at the national and local 
levels.
16 A Facebook page has been created to report on the events and 
main achievements of the initiative: https://www.facebook.
com/hiwar.mojtame/.  
17 According to contacts by the author with the key people at the 
origin of the initiative from December 2014 onwards, as well as 
participation as an observer at the first Libyan Social Dialogue 
meeting organized in Tunis on 19-21 January 2015.
18 Elders from the city in al-Asaba’ are generally well-positioned 
to conduct mediation in the Nafusa Mountains because of their 
stance during the revolution: while they were officially against 
the uprising, they remained neutral on the ground and did not 
get involved in the infighting, which explains them now being 
accepted by all the warring parties.
The situation in the Nafusa Mountains was the 
focus of the following step of the initiative, which 
concretized with the organization of a ‘Dialogue 
for comprehensive peace and reconciliation in the 
Nafusa Mountains,’ held in Djerba, Tunisia, on 17-
19 March 2015.19 This meeting, which  gathered 
more than 40 representatives from the main 
Nafusa Mountain cities and from Libya’s Council 
of Wisemen for Reconciliation, ended with the 
publication of a communiqué underlining the 
mediation procedures agreed upon to put an end to 
the conflict between Zintan and Kikla (considered 
the key point of contention in the region) and the 
concrete mechanisms for their implementation 
(in particular, the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to the peoples of the Nafusa Mountains 
and the return of displaced people). Since then, 
the mediation process has been ongoing and 
has brought significant results as regards the 
humanitarian and security situation and the free 
movement of people in the region. Even though 
they have proven difficult, the negotiations 
between Zintan and Kikla are ongoing. They have 
allowed for the progressive withdrawal of Zintan’s 
forces from Kikla and al-Qawalish, and for the 
return of some families to their homes.20
CONCLUSION
Many foreign analysts and many Libyans 
themselves insist on the fact that ‘a local approach’ 
is indispensable to find a way out of the Libyan 
crisis and that the ‘traditional social structures’ 
(most often meaning tribes) should be given 
19 Author’s participation as an observer at this meeting, organized 
in Djerba, Tunisia, on 17-19 March 2015. The meeting was orga-
nized with the financial support of the German Federal Foreign 
Ministry and the logistic support of the Norwegian Peacebuild-
ing Resource Centre (NOREF). A representative of the United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) participated as an 
observer. 
20 Author’s regular phone conversations with one of the main 
leaders of the Social Dialogue initiative since March 2015; au-
thor’s observations during a trip to the Nafusa Mountains and 
several interviews with elders and social activists from the re-
gion, February 2016.
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prominence in the political transition.21 In fact, 
the implementation and outcomes of the ‘Social 
Dialogue’ in the Nafusa Mountains provide an 
interesting case study of the role that local civil 
society actors can play in dialogue, mediation and 
conflict-resolution processes in Libya. Especially 
when they do not participate in the formal political 
scene within political parties or institutions (and 
are therefore not ‘political actors’), and when they 
are not part of any military structure and do not 
hold direct control over any such group (meaning 
that they are not ‘military leaders’), traditional 
social leaders (elders, wisemen and notables) are 
in a position to exert influence on the ground and 
contribute to conflict-resolution. 
The ‘Social Dialogue’ in the Nafusa Mountains, 
however, suggests that traditional mediation 
processes might not be fully relevant any longer, 
as the overall pattern of conflicts has changed 
and the possession of specific skills and networks 
appears increasingly key to the conduct of 
successful mediation. One striking feature of the 
‘Social Dialogue’ in this respect is that it consisted 
in traditional social leaders working hand in hand 
with young social activists, the latter facilitating 
the mediation work of the former, along lines that 
could be seen as contradicting most Libyan social 
norms.
The capacity of traditional social leaders to contain 
armed groups has also constituted a key challenge 
in Libya’s recent conflicts. Here, the Nafusa 
Mountains experience tends to show that the 
degree of cohesion of the cities and communities 
involved in the conflict has played a central role, 
with, for instance, obvious differences between 
the capacity displayed by the elders from Nalut 
(a city rather homogenous in social terms) to 
communicate with and keep hold over the armed 
groups from their city and that of the elders from 
Jadu (characterized by a more diverse social fabric, 
with several big families rivalling for influence and 
power). 
21 This is generally the view of tribal actors (both leaders and 
simple individuals), especially in eastern Libya and in the tribes 
that were prominent under Qaddafi and were marginalized po-
litically, socially and militarily after 2011 (chief among which 
are the Warfalla and Qadhadhfa tribes).
The interplay between the local context and 
developments at the national level (what could 
be called ‘external factors’, in the sense of being 
‘external’ to the local communities) has also had 
a determining impact in the Nafusa Mountains 
case. In particular, developments in the UN-led 
political dialogue in late 2014/early 2015 and the 
decision of the city of Misrata, followed by other 
key Libya Dawn actors, to back the dialogue 
proved determinant in pushing the local actors 
to compromise, as they dramatically affected the 
features of the conflict at the local level. 
The influence of foreign actors on local processes 
of conflict and conflict resolution has also 
been highlighted by the Nafusa Mountains 
experience. First, the local actors themselves 
acknowledged the importance of gaining support 
for and recognition of their mediation initiative by 
requesting financial and logistic support so as to 
remain independent from domestic sponsors, and 
by requesting the participation of representatives 
of the United Nations and foreign states at the 
‘Social Dialogue’ meeting as observers. Second, 
the success of the mediation conducted by local 
civil society leaders in the region can probably 
be seen as a consequence of the little interest that 
foreign actors have in the Nafusa Mountains: the 
region is not perceived as strategic, and it does 
not have significant resources. According to local 
actors, this is key to explaining why mediation 
attempts have proved successful in the Nafusa 
Mountains, whereas they have been much more 
difficult in southern Libya, for instance, where 
the competition for access to energy riches has so 
far constituted a major obstacle to dialogue and 
reconciliation.
Foreign actors need to be aware of the capacity 
they have to influence processes of conflict 
and conflict resolution, and of the necessity of 
assessing and managing this influence with care. 
The support and recognition they give to local 
actors (either directly or indirectly), when it takes 
place in a context of conflict, will often trigger 
competition at the local level, affect the balance of 
forces, and eventually risk resulting in increased 
fragmentation. Efforts to support local actors, in a 
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conflict-resolution perspective and more broadly, 
therefore require serious assessment of the local 
context and of the actors’ strategies.
Overall, the experience of ‘Social Dialogue’ in the 
Nafusa Mountains has underlined, however, that 
local actors (in that case local civil society actors) 
cannot be thought of as the sole and central piece 
of any strategy for successful conflict resolution 
in Libya. To bring about sustainable positive 
outcomes, their role has to considered within a 
much wider context, which also needs to include 
national and foreign actors and the interplay 
between them all.
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SMUGGLERS, TRIBES AND 
MILITIAS. THE RISE OF 
LOCAL FORCES IN THE 
TUNISIA-LIBYAN BORDER 
REGION
HAMZA MEDDEB
INTRODUCTION
The ‘Arab springs’ have disrupted the security, the 
economy and the political situation on the long-
marginalized Tunisian-Libyan border, which for 
decades has seen the flourishing of smuggling and 
border traffic. Both the Ben Ali and the Qaddafi 
regimes allowed illicit practices to develop to 
better control the population and rule over the 
border regions. On the Tunisian side, participation 
in the border economy used to be prerogatives of 
both the clientele of the hegemonic party – the 
Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique 
(RCD) – and the various protégés of the security 
services: the police, the National Guard and the 
customs services. On the Libyan side, the Qaddafi 
regime used the border resources to consolidate 
its power through a politics of clientelism and co-
optation of tribes. Only loyal tribes were allowed 
to participate in this border economy.1 The fall of 
the Ben Ali and Qaddafi regimes and the outbreak 
of the Libyan conflict plunged the border regions 
into uncertainty and violence. Since 2013 and with 
1 For the Libyan-Egyptian border case, see Thomas Husken, 
“Tribal Political Culture and the Revolution in the Cyrenaica of 
Libya”, Orient, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2012, p. 26-31.
Source: Google maps
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the multiplication of attacks, security forces have 
come back, setting the stage for the militarization 
of the region and a decisive rearrangement of the 
border economy.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: it aims 
first to describe the reorganisation of the border 
economy in the current uncertain political times, 
and second to understand what triggered the rise 
in power of non-state actors. Today, through their 
participation in unofficial and hidden forms of 
regional integration, tribes, militias, smuggling 
networks and jihadi groups are the ones shaping 
local politics and driving the relationship between 
Tunisia and Libya.
THE TURMOIL OF 2011 AND THE 
IRRUPTION OF NEW ACTORS 
INTO THE TUNISIAN-LIBYAN 
BORDERLAND
While the toppling of the Ben Ali and Qaddafi 
regimes changed the stakes, the traffic and the 
informal economy along the Tunisian-Libyan 
border remain important to this day. Borders are 
more than a dividing line as they most importantly 
constitute political resources that regimes rely on 
to govern such regions. In this situation, the term 
‘border rent’ offers a particularly apt description 
insofar as both the state and the security forces 
regulate access to the resources of the border.2 In 
the aftermath of the fall of Ben Ali, when security 
forces withdrew from the Tunisian-Libyan 
border, participation in the border economy 
expanded beyond the circles previously formed 
of the police and the customs service’s protégés. 
In this economy, the share of illicit commodities 
also increased: shotguns, drugs, more and more 
alcoholic beverages and many subsidised food 
products, along with phosphate and farm produce, 
all illegally exported to Libya. The transformation 
of Tunisia into a staging post between Algeria and 
2 Hamza Meddeb, “Rente frontalière et injustice sociale en Tu-
nisie”, in Irene Bono, Béatrice Hibou, Hamza Meddeb et Mo-
hamed Tozy, L’Etat d’injustice au Maghreb. Maroc et Tunisie, 
Paris, Karthala, 2015.
Libya for the trafficking of cannabis, narcotics and 
alcohol has had a magnetic effect, attracting new 
actors into this trade and encouraging smugglers 
to take even more risks to expand their businesses. 
Nevertheless, smugglers and traders are not the 
only actors profiting from the border rent. Both 
criminal actors involved in drug trafficking and 
jihadi groups looking to secure the crossing of 
fighters and arms have either tried to settle in 
the border region or have extended their field of 
action to include it.
In fact, the development of the border economy is 
closely linked not only to the political upheavals 
that have taken place in the region but also to 
the ways in which states have reacted to them. 
In 2011, the more Libya became bogged down 
in an armed conflict that divided its eastern and 
western regions, and the more isolated from the 
international community the Qaddafi regime 
grew, the more prosperous smugglers operating 
around Ras Jdir became, as this border crossing 
was Libya’s last gateway to the outside world. The 
fact that the conflict focused on the Tunisian-
Libyan border brought into play a sleight of 
hand in the border economy: traders operating 
around Ras Jdir supplied Qaddafi’s forces, 
whereas at the Dehiba-Wazen crossing further 
south traders refuelled Libyan rebels. In this 
period the Government of Béji Caid Essebssi 
never discouraged such a division of labour as 
it effectively reflected Tunisia’s ambivalence: 
officially, the country opted for neutrality vis-à-
vis the Libyan infighting; unofficially, it acted as a 
support base for the Libyan rebellion and allowed 
the safe crossing of arms and logistical support.
In Ben Guerdane, the inhabitants called the system 
set up by smugglers which consisted in swapping 
foodstuffs subsidized by the Tunisian government 
for Libyan oil an ‘oil-for-food programme.’ In 
fact, the conflict ended up boosting Tunisia’s 
food exports: mostly pasta, bottled mineral water 
and dairy products. At the beginning of summer 
2011 after the rebels’ takeover of the oil refineries 
and Libyan oil became scarce, Ras Jdir traffickers 
stepped in to supply Libya with oil from Tunisia, 
but mostly from Algeria, where the subsidized 
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price was infinitely cheaper than in Tunisia. 
Realizing the advantage to be derived from this 
situation, the Tunisian authorities, proving that 
they held sway over the border region, lifted the 
restriction that had previously limited Tunisian 
drivers refuelling in Algerian border petrol stations 
to a single tankful per car. In reality, traffickers had 
always easily bypassed these restrictions by paying 
bribes to gain the connivance of Algerian state 
officials, who themselves were fully aware of the 
final destination of the trafficked goods, while the 
Algerian authorities, unwavering supporters of the 
Qaddafi regime during the war, turned a blind eye. 
Smugglers from the Gafsa region played the most 
prominent role in the development of this new 
transnational supply chain by selling Algerian oil 
to Medenine- and Ben Guerdane-based traffickers, 
who in turn sold it back beyond the border. 
Afterwards, Qaddafi’s downfall plunged the 
border region into chaos. For some of the rebels, 
the traffickers from Ben Guerdane were ‘Qaddafi’s 
offspring,’ who never failed to support and provide 
for him. Consequently, a few Tunisian smugglers 
and traders known for their connections with 
Qaddafi’s troops refrained from crossing the 
border, giving free rein to their competitors. 
By 2012, the lure of money to be gained from 
border rent had attracted plenty of armed men 
who carried out all sorts of trafficking and 
racketeering. The ensuing clashes and the spread 
of violence and gunfights frequently led to the 
temporary closure of the Ras Jdir border crossing. 
Although the border arrangements collapsed in 
parallel with Qaddafi’s downfall, the trafficking 
and the informal economy never stopped, but 
nevertheless remained extremely vulnerable to 
political change. Non-state actors such as tribes, 
militias and smuggling networks sought to adapt 
to the void created by the state authorities relaxing 
their hold.
THE NEW POLITICS OF BORDER 
CONTROL
In the wake of Qaddafi’s downfall, the Libyan state 
lost control over entire regions to armed militias. 
In a way, the Tunisian Libyan border region is like 
an “area of limited statehood”3 where non-state 
actors challenge and compromise state sovereignty. 
This dynamic has been progressively fuelled since 
2011 by the politicization and the militarization 
of tribal and regional identities, which have 
induced a “militiafication of Libyan society.”4 The 
transitional process in Libya implemented after 
the fall of Qaddafi failed to contain or incorporate 
these local forces into a  democratic future and 
this in turn accentuated the fragmentation of the 
country, especially after 2014 as the country entered 
a downward spiral of violence exacerbated by the 
implantation of the Islamic State organisation in 
the region of Sirte and in the city of Sabrata, close 
to the Tunisian border.5 By setting up a camp in 
Sabrata, the jihadi group tried to take advantage of 
the security vacuum and attract Tunisian jihadists 
seeking to flee the country, especially after the 
crackdown on Ansar al-Sharia, a Tunisian Salafi 
jihadi group labelled a terrorist organization by 
the Ennahda-led government in August 2013.
Since 2011, non-state actors on the Tunisian side 
of the border have been seeking to adapt to the 
new political context. To cope with the uncertainty 
and instability generated by the frequent closures 
of the border crossings, Ben Guerdane traders 
have created an organization to protect their 
economic interests: the Tunisian-Libyan Fraternal 
Association (Association de la fraternité tuniso-
libyenne). This association negotiated the re-
establishment of the former border arrangements 
and played the role of mediator with the Tunisian 
authorities to keep the border open and ensure 
3 Thomas Risse (ed.), Governance without a State? Policies and 
Politics in areas of limited Statehood, Columbia University Press, 
2011. 
4 Roland Marchal and Christine Messiant, Les chemins de la 
guerre et de la paix. Fin de conflit en Afrique australe et orientale, 
Paris, Karthala, 1997.
5 Wolfram Lacher, “The Libyan revolution and the rise of local 
powers centres”, Mediterranean Politics, 2012, pp.167-140.
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the fluid circulation of goods. During the phases 
of insecurity and border closure that became 
frequent in 2014, the association played an 
important role in liberating Tunisian traders 
arrested or kidnapped in Libya, negotiating their 
release with Libyan militias and the restitution of 
their goods and money. These mediating practices 
imply a capacity to rally support from across the 
lines: from bureaucrats, elites in charge of security, 
tribal leaders, and heads of militias in Libya.
Acknowledging this crucial role played by non-
state actors helps us shed new light on the reign 
of insecurity that has extended over the Tunisian-
Libyan border since 2011 in spite of the efforts 
of the Tunisian and Libyan central authorities. 
Between 2011 and 2013, the Tunisian and Libyan 
authorities – represented respectively by the 
Ennahda-led government in Tunis and Libya’s 
successive transitional governments, and then the 
government formed by the elected General National 
Council (GNC) – both tried to consolidate their 
security cooperation by exchanging information, 
ensuring the opening of the border crossings and 
the free flow of goods and people across the border. 
In fact, on the Tunisian side, the lack of security 
resulted essentially from an autonomisation of the 
security forces and the disintegration of their hold 
over society, which manifested itself in a retreat of 
the security apparatus during 2011 and 2012. 
On the Libyan side, the new authorities in Tripoli 
had little influence over the armed groups. Their 
failure to gain control over the borders and to 
regulate the competition over access to the border 
resources exacerbated the conflicts between armed 
groups and made a recourse to arms inescapable. 
Many militias feared that their control over the 
trans-border traffic or merely access to the border 
resources might be lost and did everything they 
could to prevent this happening. As the political 
and military conflicts have intensified since the fall 
of Qaddafi, the objective for all the communities 
in the region is to make sure that they have access 
to at least one channel to the outside world. The 
Zuwara militiamen operating around the border 
crossing of Ras Jdir, in particular, and the Zintan 
militias operating further south have been key 
actors in this struggle.
Before 2011, the Border Guards were in charge of 
the Libyan-Tunisian border. Qaddafi mostly used 
men from the Si’an and Nwa’il communities along 
the border. After the revolution, control over the 
Dehiba-Wazzin border crossing passed into the 
hands of the Nalut military council. In an attempt 
to counter the domination of the Amazigh over all 
the border crossings between Tunisia and Libya, 
the Zintan militias tried to obtain the opening of 
a new additional border crossing, Mashhad Salah. 
Zintan also attempted to use the Si’an – who own 
the lands located along the border across the 
Hamada Desert – in a way very similar to Qaddafi. 
Convinced that initiating an open conflict with 
Nalut was not in their interest, the Zintan militias 
avoided becoming directly involved in tensions 
or clashes with Nalut groups and preferred to 
support the Si’an.
THE BORDER IN A WAR ECONOMY: 
MILITARIZATION, REPRESSION 
AND CORRUPTION
Controlling and participating in the rent is all the 
more important than the border represents a major 
resource feeding the war economy. Armed groups 
rely on the revenue generated by this economy to 
finance their activities and pay their members, 
and therefore to further reinforce their military 
capacities and expand their political clout. Overall, 
the economy has also been subject to significant 
transformations triggered by local forces during 
wartime, as shown by post-2011 developments 
in the western coastal city of Zuwara (around 70 
kilometres from the Tunisian border and Tripoli). 
There, the local council (al majlis al mahali) has 
demonstrated its interest in consolidating its 
income and in gaining autonomy. With this aim, 
it has tried to control the cross-border trade with 
Tunisia by investing in the construction of an 
airport and port facilities. These efforts result from 
a multitude of rationales: following an economic 
rationale, local businessmen have promoted the 
city as an import-export platform able to compete 
with the chaos-ridden capital Tripoli or with the 
allied city of Misrata; a military rationale relies on 
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the consolidation of the cross-border economy to 
provide for militias; and finally a political rationale 
induces the city to become more prominent 
within the Dawn Libya coalition and during the 
negotiations with the warring Libyan parties. 
The example set by Zuwara has repeated itself 
in Misrata and other Libyan cities and regions, 
demonstrating that the order that will emerge 
from chaos will be the result of fierce competition 
and perpetual attempts by the non-state actors to 
strengthen their positions on the ground. 
In Tunisia, the security situation strongly 
deteriorated with the multiplication of terrorist 
attacks in 2015, driving the government to put 
border security systems into place to limit the 
risks of infiltration by jihadi groups. In the wake 
of the Sousse attack in June 2015, the head of 
the Nidaa Tounes-led Government, Habib Essid, 
announced that a double sand ditch would be 
dug along the 200km-long Tunisian-Libyan 
border, but this announcement was made after 
the work had already begun in April 2015. This 
attempt to turn Tunisia into a fortress illustrates 
the authorities’ inability to cope in a highly 
unstable regional environment, abandoned to the 
incursive operations of armed non-state actors. 
As for relationships with Libya, both the foreign 
policies regarding Libya of the 2014 government 
of technocrats and Habib Essid’s early 2015 
government appeared guided by a common dislike 
of the Libya Dawn (Fajr Libia) coalition and by a 
vision of Tunisia as a “citadel under siege.”6   The 
ban on Libyan flights, the tightening of border 
control, and the arrest of Libya Dawn leaders, 
while confirming that Tunisia has abandoned 
its neutrality vis-à-vis the Libyan conflict, have 
inflamed relationships with its neighbour.
Furthermore, the closure of the Ras Jdir and 
Dehiba-Wazen border crossings by the Tunisian 
authorities in February 2016 triggered massive 
protests that reached a climax on 10 February 
when the Tatatouine Governorate and the City of 
Ben Guerdane organized a day of general strike. 
A crackdown on protests is keeping the pressure 
on the border high, and it has now been placed 
6 Michel Camau and Vincent  Geisser, Le Syndrome autoritaire. 
Politique en Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali, Paris, Presses de 
Sciences Po, 2003.
under military control. However, in the absence 
of concrete measures to tackle the regulatory 
and economic discrepancies that exist on both 
sides of the border, its militarisation is proving 
unsuccessful at stopping traffic. On the contrary, 
state agent corruption is getting worse, which in 
turn undermines governmental control, increases 
the porosity of the borders, and finally fails to 
restore the only arrangements that can keep state 
violence in check.
Through the militarisation of the border, the 
Tunisian army has now entered the stage. While 
it was sent to regulate illicit economic flows, 
following the current example of the various state 
services this is most likely to result in its taking 
hold of part of the border rent through bribes. 
The failure of the army, the National Guard and 
the police to organize common patrols is partially 
explained by the fact that too much surveillance 
could curtail these practices. As a result, each 
body is organizing its patrols independently of the 
others. A spread of uncertainty is following this 
democratization of corruption: paying bribes no 
longer guarantees a border crossing and payments 
are required at each and every stop. Corruption is 
so widespread and sought after that it resembles 
what Frank Gunter calls “entrepreneurial 
corruption.”7 Some of the smugglers carrying 
gold, spirits or large sums of money are resorting 
to hiring a ‘joker’ – a state agent who sits next to 
the driver as a cash escort to secure the way.
This undiscriminating repression and the 
corruption that it generates are likely to fuel the 
discontent of the people living in the border region, 
a situation that jihadi groups have already sought 
to exploit in order to recruit and strengthen their 
troops. During the month of July 2015, around 
thirty ‘youths’ from Remada left the border region 
to join the Islamic State in Libya (ISL). On March 
7 2016, ISL launched a major attack to take hold of 
the Tunisian border city of Ben Guerdane, and did 
so by attempting to set the local population against 
the state authorities. Radical Islam has provided 
a grammar for the revolt of the disenfranchised 
7 Franck Gunter, Political Economy of Iraq. Restoring Balance in a 
Post-Conflict Society, Cheltenham Glos., Edward Elgar Publica-
tions, 2013.
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in Tunisia.8 They feed the jihadist threat and set 
the state services up for a form of “border game,”9 
which, instead of containing it, keeps the threat 
alive while at the same time strengthening the 
state services in charge of fighting it.
CONCLUSION
The insecurity in the Tunisian-Libyan border 
region needs to be addressed by folding the 
security component into a political strategy. On 
the Tunisian side, the situation in the border region 
is the result of a long period of central authority 
neglect. The inhabitants’ discourse on the ‘absence 
of the state’ in a highly militarized region reflects a 
popular demand for a non-security presence of the 
state: improved infrastructure, health, education 
and basic services, economic opportunities and a 
development strategy that takes into consideration 
the historical and geographical ties that connect 
this region to western Libya. In this respect, a 
free trade zone could help the organisation of the 
informal cross-border trade and empower the 
population. Instead of isolating Tunisia’s south-
eastern region, it is important to regulate and 
coordinate regional integration with the Libyan 
Government of National Accord when it comes 
into function in Tripoli. 
On the Libyan side, developments in the border 
region illustrate the extent to which local alliances 
and conflicts are not mainly, or not only, driven 
by national political cleavages. Local strategies 
related to control of the border rent indeed played 
an important role in their shaping and need to be 
taken into account by the political actors at the 
central level. The Government of National Accord 
led by Fayez al-Sarraj, in particular, should be 
aware of this fact in his endeavour to establish new 
and sustainable power arrangements.
8 Georges Fahmi and Hamza Meddeb, “Market for Jihad. Radi-
calization in Tunisia”, Carnegie Paper, October 2015. 
9 Peter  Andreas, Border Games. Policing the US-Mexico Divide, 
Ithaca, Cornell University, 2001.
The new central authorities in Tripoli therefore 
need to coordinate their efforts with the 
international community in order to foster a 
decentralized mode of government that would 
allow state-building and would gain legitimacy 
in the eyes of the local forces. Addressing the 
issues of disarmament and demobilisation of the 
armed groups should include paying attention to 
the economic challenges related to both dynamics 
– the war economy and the transformation of 
the peacetime economy in wartime – in order to 
successfully rebuild the security apparatus and the 
Libyan army.
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JIHADISM AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH 
YOUTH CULTURE AND 
IDEOLOGY: THE CASE 
OF ANSAR AL-SHARIA IN 
LIBYA
MARY FITZGERALD
Ansar al-Sharia, the largest jihadist group to 
emerge in Libya after the ousting of Muammar 
Gaddafi in 2011, quickly developed a presence 
in several cities and towns across the country. Its 
biggest branch in terms of membership was in 
Benghazi, the focus of this paper. While Ansar 
al-Sharia began as an armed group with its ranks 
comprising mostly young men who had fought 
in the various revolutionary brigades that sprang 
up during the uprising against Gaddafi, its strong 
focus on charitable and dawa (preaching) activities 
helped it develop a wider support base that cut 
across the socio-economic spectrum.
In many respects, Ansar al-Sharia presented a 
generational challenge to older jihadists (or those 
of a former jihadist background) who had come 
of age in the 1980s and 1990s. Its modus operandi 
– being at once an armed group but also a wider 
movement with social programmes designed to 
win hearts and minds – was different because the 
environment in which it operated between 2012 
and May 2014 was different. Under the Gaddafi 
regime, Islamists of all shades were severely 
repressed and their activities driven underground, 
whereas the period after his ousting allowed for 
a flourishing of such currents. By drawing on 
interviews with members of Ansar al-Sharia and 
their family and social circles during field work 
in Benghazi between 2012 and May 2014 (when 
Khalifa Haftar launched his Operation Dignity 
against Ansar al-Sharia and other armed groups), 
this chapter will explore how and why the group 
became a social phenomenon.
A GENERATIONAL DIVIDE
In order to situate Ansar al-Sharia within the 
spectrum of jihadism in Libya, it is necessary 
to examine the three successive generations 
of jihadists that emerged there from the 1980s 
and the cleavages between them. All three were 
shaped by sharply different experiences both 
inside and outside of Libya and this tended to 
colour the very different ways they responded 
to the new political and social landscape created 
by Gaddafi’s dislodging. The older generation 
comprises those born in the 1960s and early 1970s 
whose first experience of armed jihad was against 
Soviet-backed forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Libyan veterans of the Afghan jihad 
created a number of groups, of which the largest 
was the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG, al-
Jama’a al-Islamiya al-Muqatila bi-Libiya), which 
operated in secret for a number of years before 
declaring its existence in 1995. Following several 
attempts to assassinate Gaddafi in that decade, the 
LIFG and other affiliated groups were subjected 
to a ruthless crackdown by the regime. LIFG 
redoubts in the Green Mountains area of eastern 
Libya, particularly around Derna, were bombed, 
and thousands were rounded up and jailed. That 
routing, along with the bitter experiences many 
LIFG members had in Algeria and Afghanistan 
in the 1990s, was instrumental in the decision 
by the LIFG leadership – most of whom were in 
prison by then – to rethink their strategy, a move 
that eventually resulted in their highly publicised 
disavowal of armed struggle in 2009. Two years 
later, however, the former LIFG leadership and 
cadres, many of whom had been released in 2010, 
were quick to join the uprising. Several former 
LIFG figures, including its last leader Abdelhakim 
Belhaj, played key roles in the revolution and 
went on to embrace the country’s post-Gaddafi 
democratic transition, forming political parties 
and running in elections. This did not sit well 
with the second and third generations of jihadists, 
who gravitated towards more radical currents and 
rejected democracy as un-Islamic.
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The older LIFG members had disagreed with 
the second generation of jihadists in discussions 
that had taken place in the cells of Abu Salim, 
the Tripoli prison where 1,200 dissidents, most 
of them Islamists, were killed by regime forces in 
1996. It was in Abu Salim that the LIFG leadership 
drafted its revision of armed struggle. Many of 
the second generation – and the generation that 
followed it – had been radicalised by seeing older 
members of their families, including fathers, 
uncles and cousins, rounded up, tortured, jailed or 
killed by the regime during the 1990s crackdown. 
Others were radicalised by their own experiences 
of incarceration – a substantial number were 
initially jailed in Abu Salim on flimsy premises, 
including having relatives accused of opposition 
activity; hundreds more were radicalised by the 
experience of fighting as part of the insurgency 
in Iraq that followed the US invasion in 2003. 
According to the so-called Sinjar records seized 
by US forces, Libyans comprised the second-
largest group among the 700 foreign fighters 
who joined al-Qaeda’s Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) 
between summer 2006 and 2007. More than half 
of these recruits gave their hometown as Derna, 
while almost a quarter originated from Benghazi. 
Many of those who had become steeped in the 
more radical ideology of ISI leader Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi were jailed by the regime on their 
return to Libya. A number were later freed as 
part of prisoner releases that followed the LIFG 
rehabilitation process in 2009 and the rest later 
broke out of Abu Salim and other jails when 
Tripoli fell to rebel forces in August 2011.
While Ansar al-Sharia’s leadership tended to be 
drawn from this second generation, the majority 
of its rank and file were from the generation that 
came after it. These were youths who were in their 
teens and early twenties when the uprising against 
Gaddafi began in February 2011. Many quit school 
or university to flock to the frontline, where they 
engaged in combat for the first time, an experience 
that changed them in several ways, making some 
more devout and later more radical. While Ansar 
al-Sharia’s largest branch was in Benghazi, two 
other smaller branches later emerged in Derna 
and Ajdabiya, another eastern town historically 
known for its militant currents. What all three 
places shared was a history of jihadism and the fact 
many local youths fought in the eastern frontline 
in 2011.
Very few of the revolutionary brigades that formed 
during the uprising were exclusively Islamist, let 
alone radical, but after the fall of Gaddafi more 
ideological elements began organising themselves 
into new groups and among these was what would 
become known as Ansar al-Sharia. Long before 
Ansar al-Sharia declared itself in summer 2012, 
senior figures from the former LIFG, including 
its main ideologue Sami al-Saadi, were privately 
expressing concern about the agenda of individuals 
such as Mohammed al-Zahawi, later the leader 
of Ansar al-Sharia, whom they knew from their 
prison days together.1 
THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF 
ANSAR AL-SHARIA IN BENGHAZI
In early 2012, radical elements in Benghazi’s main 
revolutionary brigades split away to establish 
Ansar al-Sharia. Its leader, Mohammed al-
Zahawi, claimed that the other brigades were 
insufficiently committed to pushing for the 
immediate implementation of sharia law.2 That 
criticism notwithstanding, the group made its first 
public appearance alongside a number of other 
armed groups during a parade held in central 
Benghazi weeks before Libya’s first post-Gaddafi 
elections later that June. While all the participants 
in the parade called for the introduction of 
sharia, some like Ansar al-Sharia also denounced 
democracy as heresy, an argument echoed by 
Zahawi in a TV appearance just before the 
polling day. Other Islamists in Benghazi who had 
embraced the democratic process, including some 
former Abu Salim inmates who were running for 
election themselves, tried to quietly remonstrate 
with Zahawi’s circle. They managed to persuade 
1 Interviews with the author in Tripoli and Benghazi, February 
2012.
2 Interview with the author, September 2012.
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Ansar al-Sharia to, if not support the elections, at 
least agree to not physically disrupt them. They 
also succeeded in peeling away some younger 
members in the run-up to the ballot.3 These efforts 
would continue over the next two years but never 
reached a critical mass, with Ansar al-Sharia’s 
appeal proving stronger in the majority of cases 
than attempts by communities or even families to 
dissuade youths from becoming involved.
The fallout from the attack on the US diplomatic 
mission in Benghazi in September 2012 marked 
a turning point for Ansar al-Sharia. Its leadership 
denied involvement as a group but acknowledged 
that individual members may have taken part 
in the assault, which resulted in the death of 
Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three 
compatriots.4 Mass protests took place in Benghazi 
and Ansar al-Sharia’s base was stormed. Partly as 
a result of pressure from interlocutors and partly 
as a way of gaining a stronger social foothold, the 
group began downplaying its armed component 
and instead tried to highlight its charitable work. 
It was encouraged to do so by local mediators, 
including mainstream Islamists, some of whom 
were parliamentarians in the General National 
Congress who believed that by finding a social 
space for Ansar al-Sharia and the young men drawn 
to its ideology the organisation could be managed 
and its armed wing eventually disbanded.
These older Islamists, several of whom were drawn 
from the first generation of jihadists, often spoke 
disparagingly of the Ansar al-Sharia rank and file 
as young ‘hot-heads’ unschooled in the nuances of 
theology. “We ask them what they want and they 
struggle to articulate it,” complained one mediator, 
a sheikh who had spent decades in Abu Salim and 
ran for election in 2012. “All they know, or think 
they know, is that they are right, and we are wrong. 
They display a real arrogance of youth and it is 
worse because they are armed.”5
Another mediator from Salmani, a disadvantaged 
Benghazi neighbourhood where many youths 
3 Interviews with the author, Benghazi, June/July 2012.
4 Interview with the author, September 2012.
5 Interviews with the author, Benghazi 2012-2014.
joined Ansar al-Sharia, was accused of Sufi 
leanings by young radicals, although he described 
himself as mainstream Salafist. Salmani residents 
regularly approached this mediator for help, asking 
him to persuade their sons away from Ansar al-
Sharia, but his attempts at doing so brought him 
death threats. “These youths throw around words 
they have little understanding of,” he said. “It is 
as though they are rebelling against everything, 
including their families.”6
While Zahawi came from a modest background – 
he worked in an electronics store after his release 
from prison – the rest of Ansar al-Sharia spanned 
a broad socio-economic spectrum. Among them 
were former members of the Libyan military 
– one of whom served on the group’s shura 
council – along with doctors, engineers, teachers 
and construction workers. Its spokesman at the 
time of the US diplomatic mission attack was an 
English-speaking teacher who had worked at one 
of Benghazi’s private international schools which 
catered for the city’s elite. While many of Ansar 
al-Sharia’s rank and file came from Benghazi’s 
poorer districts like Salmani and Laithi, where 
there was a long history of jihadist activity, others 
were the scions of middle class families. Some 
had ‘found God’ after overcoming troubled pasts 
that often included alcohol or drug abuse, the 
latter being a particularly acute social problem 
in Benghazi. Others were promising high school 
or university students. A number of these were 
‘weekend warriors’ in that they volunteered to 
man checkpoints or do charitable work on their 
days off. Others quit school or university to devote 
themselves entirely to the organisation. Relatives 
of such young men tended to frame the appeal of 
Ansar al-Sharia as “giving them a stronger sense 
of identity through being part of something bigger 
than themselves.”7
Many were recruited at neighbourhood mosques; 
if a young man was observed to be particularly 
pious, he would be approached by Ansar al-
Sharia recruiters, very often of a similar age, and 
gradually drawn into their circle. A significant 
6 Interview with the author, Benghazi 2014.
7 Interviews with the author, Benghazi 2014.
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number of the group’s foot soldiers were young 
men who had bonded with each other through the 
shared experience of fighting in the frontline and 
seeing friends die during the 2011 uprising. 
The father of one recruit, a university student 
whose sisters studied medicine and architecture, 
described the diversity he encountered at one of 
Ansar al-Sharia’s public events: “I wanted to know 
what my son was getting involved with. I didn’t 
expect such a large crowd and I didn’t expect to 
see people from so many different walks of life. 
There were people from all levels of society. What 
was striking was the sense of fraternity among 
them, though I told the leaders I met that while 
they appeared to be doing some good work I could 
not shake the sense of a dark cloud when it came 
to their ideology.”8
HEARTS AND MINDS
Before summer 2014, when Khalifa Haftar 
launched an offensive against Ansar al-Sharia 
and other militias in Benghazi, the group had up 
to 300 men under arms in the city, along with a 
broader support base that ran into thousands. 
Key to building the latter was the outreach 
strategy Ansar al-Sharia adopted from late 2012. 
Its leaders saw this campaign, with its strong 
focus on charitable work and social services, as a 
crucial foundation stone for developing a society 
based on its definition of Islamic principles and 
leading to an eventual Islamic state overseen by 
its interpretation of sharia. The opening of public 
space in the wake of the overthrow of Gaddafi 
presented opportunities in this sense that had not 
been available to previous generations of jihadists, 
whose main focus, as a result, was armed struggle 
against the regime.
One of Ansar al-Sharia’s most successful initiatives 
in Benghazi was its anti-drugs campaign. Tapping 
into concerns over the rise in drug consumption 
after Gaddafi – cities like Benghazi became flooded 
with illicit drugs as trafficking grew – the group 
launched a public awareness drive, with a strong 
8 Interview with the author, Benghazi 2014.
focus on schools and universities. It also opened 
a medical clinic, an Islamic centre for women, 
and a religious school named Mirkaz al-Imam 
al-Bukhari Li-l-‘Ulum al-Sharia. It organised 
food distribution for the needy (particularly 
on religious holidays, including Eid), arranged 
collections of household and other waste and held 
Quranic recitation contests and sports events for 
children. 
Ansar al-Sharia’s anti-drugs drive, which employed 
a slickly produced advertising campaign, gained 
the endorsement of several local entities including 
a rehabilitation clinic, a telecommunications firm 
and al-Ahli, the city’s leading football club. Ansar 
al-Sharia also managed to get support from the 
Benghazi Central Blood Centre to launch blood 
drives and its road cleaning programme was 
carried out in cooperation with the city council. 
This buy-in by local partners was key to the group’s 
sense of self as an important player in Benghazi. 
While local mediators eager to undermine 
Ansar al-Sharia’s armed wing encouraged such 
collaboration, believing it would eventually result 
in the group becoming a relatively harmless part 
of civil society, its armed component remained 
the raison d’être for a large number – if not the 
majority – of its members and supporters.
Ansar al-Sharia also provided security at the al-
Jala’ hospital. This facility, which housed the only 
trauma unit in Benghazi, had been subjected to 
numerous attacks by militia and criminal elements 
since 2011. While acknowledging they disagreed 
with Ansar al-Sharia’s ideology, the staff there 
praised its members for being more disciplined 
and reliable than other armed groups that had 
previously been tasked to guard the hospital.9 On 
a number of occasions, rival groups drove Ansar 
al-Sharia from the hospital only for the staff to 
insist they return. 
Ansar al-Sharia’s local outreach activities as 
outlined above, as well as the humanitarian work 
its members undertook in Syria, Sudan and Gaza, 
were documented extensively on its social media 
network, which included active Facebook pages 
9 Interviews with the author, Benghazi, 2014.
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and Twitter accounts. Its al-Raya media wing 
also produced high quality videos of its charitable 
programmes, as well as its armed drills and 
parades. In addition to understanding the power 
of social media when it came to reaching a younger 
audience, the group also clearly understood the 
importance of branding: its logo of an open Quran 
flanked by crossed Kalashnikovs was emblazoned 
not just across its social media and printed 
publications, but also on T-shirts, hats and other 
paraphernalia distributed at its public events. 
CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPACT OF 
KHALIFA HAFTAR’S OPERATION 
DIGNITY
The public support Khalifa Haftar gathered in 
Benghazi for his unilateral offensive against armed 
groups, including Ansar al-Sharia, in May 2014 was 
due to mounting frustrations over deteriorating 
security. In particular, a series of assassinations of 
not only former regime security personnel but also 
civil society activists, judges and journalists had 
caused much anger, with many believing Ansar al-
Sharia was responsible. In January 2014, the US 
State Department had designated Ansar al-Sharia 
in Benghazi a terrorist organisation, which put 
further pressure on the group, as did the capture 
of one of its associates, Ahmed Abukhattalah, by 
US special forces that June.
The debate over how to deal with Ansar al-Sharia 
– or at least how to rein in its armed wing – had 
divided locals. Some believed dialogue was the 
answer: “they are sons of Benghazi and should be 
dealt with as such” was a frequent refrain. There 
were a number of attempts at mediation between 
the leaders of Ansar al-Sharia and military 
commander Wanis Bukhamada, whose Saiqa 
special forces clashed several times with Ansar al-
Sharia fighters in the city. 
With hindsight, some of those who advocated a 
policy of dialogue alone acknowledge they were 
naive regarding the intentions of the group’s 
hardliners. Other observers, including former 
jihadists of the first generation, particularly LIFG 
members, believed that as many as possible of 
the less ideologically driven should be peeled 
away through dialogue before the ‘irreconcilables’ 
were dealt with by force. In their view, Haftar 
radicalised a far larger cohort by declaring war on 
a wide range of armed groups.
Those who rallied in favour of Haftar, among 
them former jihadists of the first generation who 
had fallen out with their erstwhile associates in 
the LIFG, believed a ‘force-only’ approach was 
necessary.  In fact, Haftar’s actions initially served 
to swell the ranks of Ansar al-Sharia, transformed 
it back into a purely fighting group, and resulted 
in other less ideological Benghazi militias uniting 
with it in self-defence.
Almost two years on from the launch of Operation 
Dignity, fighting continues in Benghazi and Ansar 
al-Sharia’s original leadership has been decapitated. 
With the group in disarray, a significant number 
of its rank and file – particularly those who were 
initially drawn to its swagger and perceived 
influence – have joined Islamic State’s affiliate in 
the city for similar reasons.
The evolution of Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi from 
an armed group to a wider social movement and 
back again offers lessons on the historical and 
social roots of extremism in Libya and how it may 
be addressed in the future. While Haftar claims 
to be eradicating extremism from eastern Libya, 
his tactics of violence and repression, much of 
it arbitrary – which echo those used by Gaddafi 
in the 1990s – show all the signs of sowing the 
seeds for another generation of radicalised youth 
seeking revenge.
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THE ISLAMIC STATE IN 
LIBYA: STRATEGY AND 
REALITY ON THE GROUND
SEIF EDDIN TRABELSI AND  
VIRGINIE COLLOMBIER1
From a country of either origin or transit for 
Libyan or foreign fighters wishing to join the 
forces hostile to Bashar Al Assad’s regime in Syria, 
Libya itself became a land of jihad and a target 
for the organisation of the Islamic State (IS) from 
the end of 2013. Taking advantage of the political 
and security vacuum prevailing in the country, 
IS succeeded in taking root and spreading its 
influence in various towns along the coastal strip. 
In 2015, the organisation was at least present – 
more or less visibly and with varying capacities 
and degrees of influence according to the locality – 
in Derna, Benghazi, Sirte and Sabratha. It was also 
able to conduct operations in Tripoli and Misrata.
As analysis of its installation and development 
specifically in Derna initially and then in Sirte 
after its defeat in Derna shows, IS did not have a 
comprehensive project for Libya. On the contrary, 
it was forced to adjust its strategy and its actions 
to the local situation and the characteristics of the 
towns that it identified as potentially suitable for 
its development.   Interaction with local actors, 
but also the interests and strategies of the principal 
political and military forces at the national level, 
thus considerably influenced the capacity of IS to 
assert itself and spread its control.
1 This contribution is based essentially on groundwork con-
ducted by Seif Eddin Trabelsi in Libya and on meetings he held 
with Libyan actors in direct or indirect contact with the Islamic 
State Organisation (IS). He also draws on an analysis of differ-
ent IS communication supports, press releases and information 
published by the Rada’ Special Deterrence Forces (a brigade in 
Tripoli attached to the Ministry of the Interior) and the Libyan 
security services. The reflections and the drafting are the result 
of the combined work of Seif Eddin Trabelsi and Virginie Col-
lombier.
LIBYA AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR 
FIGHTERS HEADING TOWARDS 
SYRIA
To understand the birth of IS in Libya it is 
necessary to go back to 2011, in particular to the 
announcement of the end of military operations 
by the National Transition Council (NTC) in 
October. Among the many –mostly Islamist– 
prisoners who were then freed, at first several 
dozen and then several hundred made the choice 
to head towards Syria. There were in effect some 
similarities between the Libyan and Syrian 
situations (the repressive reaction of the two 
regimes to the popular uprising), so that for some 
Libyan revolutionaries the fight against the Syrian 
regime became a natural extension of the fight 
against the Qaddafi regime.
Those who chose to head for Syria had relatively 
varied profiles. The first to leave in 2011 were 
those who had joined a jihadi brigade (katiba) 
during the revolution and were willing to pursue 
the combat in Syria after Qaddafi’s death. The 
majority, however, were not only motivated by 
religious conviction and the desire to join the 
jihad but equally by their solidarity with the 
Syrian people. Most of them went to join the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA) without the question of their 
religious or political inclinations playing a role in 
this affiliation.
The second wave of departures, in 2012, was 
different in that it contained some, essentially 
veterans from Afghanistan, who were considered 
‘leaders’ of the jihadi movement. They chose 
to join the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra or to found 
their own combat units, mainly comprising 
Libyans and foreign fighters. This was the case, for 
example, of the Omar Al-Moktar brigade and of 
the al-Umma brigade, both founded by Libyans. 
At a later stage, these combat units were to join 
Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL). This wave of departures also 
included a second generation of Libyan jihadis, 
younger, who had made the choice to leave Libya 
to fight in the war against the US Marines in Iraq 
in 2003. In addition, there were numerous ‘Abu 
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Salim veterans’ (referring to the infamous Abu 
Salim prison, considered to be one of the worst 
of the Qaddafi regime’s detention centres) among 
those who decided to leave.
The Libyan fighters’ decision to join one or another 
group in the Syrian rebellion was increasingly 
made according to which group would welcome 
them on their arrival. In 2013, a large majority of 
the Libyans fighting in Syria were divided between 
Jabhat al-Nusra and IS. Later, these fighters were 
assigned the task of establishing and developing 
in Libya the organisation that welcomed them in 
Syria, of which they would become the core group.
THE CHOICE OF LIBYA AS THE 
PLATFORM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF IS 
Until 2013, Libyans wishing to go to Syria benefited 
from the support of local networks that helped 
them in their endeavour. Libya was also a transit 
point or a springboard for foreigners wanting to 
go and fight in Syria, particularly Tunisians. From 
the end of 2013/early 2014 the situation changed: 
Libya ceased to be a point of departure or a transit 
zone and became a destination. IS decided to 
make Libya one of its main settlements beyond the 
Syrian-Iraqi borders.
Libya had several advantages considered to be 
particularly propitious for the development of 
the organisation. The collapse of the Qaddafi 
regime created a political, institutional and 
security vacuum and no force was able to take 
control of a large part of the Libyan territory or 
of its borders. The war in 2011 also contributed 
to worsening or creating new fractures in Libyan 
society, in particular between the February 17th 
revolutionaries and the followers of the former 
regime, but also between tribes, towns and 
communities, or again between the west, east and 
south of the country. Political divisions and the 
struggle for power and resources among groups 
and communities were sometimes grafted onto 
ethnic differences, such as, for example, that 
between the Tuaregs, Toubous and Arab tribes 
in the south, which in some cases led to violent 
clashes.
IS also sought to take advantage of Libya’s 
geographical location to use it as a forward base 
in North Africa and a platform from which the 
organisation could envisage its expansion towards 
other territories. Thus, Libya provided a fulcrum 
for development towards the south, particularly 
towards other rising jihadi organisations such 
as Boko Haram. The presence of IS in Libya also 
enabled it to contemplate developing towards 
the north and establishing a network that would 
enable it to come closer to Europe and take the fight 
there. This was a destabilisation strategy aiming to 
divide the military and security efforts of Western 
countries by multiplying the fronts. Later on, by 
acting thus, IS also sought to detract attention 
from, and if possible to diminish the international 
coalition’s military pressure on, Raqqa, the Syrian 
capital of the Caliphate.
In addition, Libya is a rich country. Its energy 
resources (oil and gas) make it especially attractive 
to an organisation in search of funding sources. 
The resources available are also linked with the 
presence of large quantities of arms abandoned 
by the Qaddafi regime or imported during the 
revolution.
From mid-2014 and former General Khalifa 
Haftar’s triggering of military operation ‘Dignity’ 
(Karama) in Benghazi, Libya provided the 
organisation with a new war front. At first, the IS 
jihadis returned to Derna.
THE CHOICE OF DERNA AND 
THE FIRST OBSTACLES TO THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF IS IN LIBYA
IS chose to concentrate on and invest in Derna, a 
city with 160,000 inhabitants close to the frontier 
with Egypt and known as one of the bastions of 
Islamist opposition to Qaddafi in the 1990s.2 
2 From the 1990s, armed opposition to the Qaddafi regime was 
essentially led by Islamist groups who often found refuge in the 
east of the country, which was less loyal to the regime. The city 
of Derna became a particular focus point for this opposition, 
due to its environment and a terrain suitable for developing a 
maquis. The opponents of Qaddafi’s regime were far more nu-
merous in the east than in the west, and this gave the jihadi 
groups their most important recruitment base in this region. 
See Isabelle Mandraud, Du Djihad aux Urnes. Le Parcours Sin-
gulier d’Abdelhakim Belhadj, Paris, Stock, 2013.
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IS hoped to take advantage of a suitable local site 
and the geographical proximity of Egypt to attract 
and profit from the radicalisation of the Islamists 
who were victims of the repression after General 
Sissi’s coup in July 2013.
Like in the majority of the towns in Libya after 
2011, local governance in Derna was essentially 
provided by two institutions: a municipal council in 
charge of services for the population and a military 
council formed of the town’s principal brigades 
in charge of providing security. In Derna, the 
military council was the Consultative Committee 
of the Derna Mujahidin (Majlis Shura Mujahidin 
Darna) and was formed of three brigades: the Abu 
Salim Martyrs brigade (of Islamist tendency, the 
most important and the best armed), the Salah 
Eddin  brigade and the Derna Revolutionaries’ 
brigade.
On their arrival in Derna, the jihadis returning 
from Syria founded the Islamic youth consultative 
committee (IYCC, Majlis Shura Shabab Al Islam),3 
a structure whose activities were concentrated at 
first in the social domain.4 In a city that had been 
totally abandoned by the state, their reception 
by the inhabitants was somewhat positive. From 
October 2014, the IYCC swore allegiance to IS, 
which aroused opposition from the Abu Salim 
Martyrs brigade.
Although it rejected IS control over the city, the 
Abu Salim Martyrs brigade nonetheless hesitated 
at first to enter into a direct confrontation with the 
IYCC. Then, Khalifa Haftar initiated the military 
operation ‘Dignity’ in Benghazi, which indistinctly 
targeted jihadi groups, Islamist brigades and 
revolutionary groups. The city of Derna was 
directly attacked by the operation in the form of 
air raids against the Abu Salim Martyrs brigade’s 
positions and a siege of the city by Haftar’s forces 
after various failed attempts on the part of the 
latter to advance. In this context, the Abu Salim 
Martyrs brigade chose not to open a new front 
within the city by directly opposing IS. This was 
3 http://www.newsabah.com/wp/newspaper/22166.
4 The IYCC mainly provides material aid for families in difficulty, 
medicines and care for the sick, gifts for religious occasions and 
school supplies. 
to better fight against Haftar, but also because it 
encountered a problem of arms and munitions 
owing to the siege of the city.5
Only in June 2015 following the assassination by 
an IS member of Nasser Al Akr, a council member, 
did the confrontation between the Mujahidin 
council of Derna and IS really explode. The 
population sided massively with the Abu Salim 
Martyrs brigade against IS, and a large number of 
civilians undertook to fight alongside the brigade. 
IS was forced out of the city at the end of a week of 
fighting and withdrew to the region of al-Fatayeh 
in the surroundings of the city. After enduring its 
first defeat in Libya, the organisation focused its 
strategy on the town of Sirte, believing that the 
local terrain would be more favourable. At the end 
of April 2016, when IS lost all its positions around 
Derna, the members of the organisation retreated 
to Sirte.
ANSAR AL-SHARIA IN SIRTE, 
A FOOTHOLD FOR THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF IS
Socially structured around the Qadhadhfa tribe, 
the city of Sirte had traditionally been one of the 
principal bastions of Qaddafi’s regime, remaining 
faithful to him during the revolution and the 2011 
war. The city then contained few opponents, with 
the exception of some dissidents organised in the 
Sirte Revolutionaries’ brigade, for the most part 
jihadis. Many of these had fought in Afghanistan 
(the veterans) or in Iraq (the younger fighters). 
Most of them had been imprisoned in Abu Slim. 
Sirte was the last stronghold to fall into the rebels’ 
hands. This happened in October 2011, during 
heavy fighting marked by bombardments that 
caused considerable damage.6 After the end of the 
fighting, the vast majority of the revolutionary 
brigades chose to withdraw and refocus on Tripoli 
or Benghazi. Their presence on the ground in the 
country’s largest cities (or in the area of the oil 
Crescent) was a decisive factor for groups wanting 
5 http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2014/8/12/
6  http://elaph.com/Web/news/2011/10/690132.html.
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to strengthen their influence and carry weight in 
the new political and security equation and gain 
new resources.
The retreat of the key revolutionary brigades after 
taking the city immediately posed the question of 
handling security. The responsibility for making 
the city safe and governing it after the end of the 
fighting was taken on by the Sirte Revolutionaries’ 
brigade and other Jihadi brigades. Early in 
2012, the majority of the members of the Sirte 
Revolutionaries’ brigade pledged allegiance to 
Ansar al-Sharia. The activities of Ansar al-Sharia 
in Sirte were not highly organised at first and did 
not have a clear plan or vision. These included 
keeping order and combating organised crime 
(especially drug trafficking), and social activities, 
which were particularly appreciated in a city 
that had been utterly destroyed by the war and 
abandoned by the new authorities in Tripoli. The 
city also became a destination for foreign jihadis, 
mainly Tunisians and Sudanese who arrived via 
the Ansar al-Sharia networks in Tunisia. The 
followers of the organisation effectively left their 
country following the Tunisian government’s 
decision in August 2013 to consider Ansar al-
Sharia a terrorist organisation.7
In the jihadi field, in 2012 and 2013 Ansar al-
Sharia’s military action in Sirte was apparently 
limited to training and sending fighters to Syria and 
to supporting jihadi groups in the north of Mali 
by supplying them with weapons. The declaration 
of the Caliphate by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 
June 2014 marked a break. Initially, most of the 
Ansar al-Sharia leaders had reservations about 
IS, especially because of the relations between 
the organisation and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria (in 
particular the transport of fighters from Libya to 
Syria). However, there was a change with the arrival 
in Sirte of Turki al-Binali, originally from Bahrein 
and a member of the IS central Shura council. His 
arrival8  was part of the organisation’s strategy of 
moving into the city by sending leaders who were 
7 The confrontation with the Tunisian authorities had begun six 
months earlier. 
8 In July 2014, according to testimonies gathered during inter-
views conducted by Seif Eddin Trabelsi.
often charismatic and good speakers so that with 
their activities they would gradually reverse the 
balance of power within Ansar al-Sharia in favour 
of the group of IS partisans. Al-Binali and other 
IS leaders sought to recruit supporters in the city 
and they welcomed and organised jihadis arriving 
from abroad. Thus, new pro-IS leaders emerged 
within Ansar al-Sharia, while the old pro-Jabhat 
al-Nusra leaders were gradually forced into a 
minority and became isolated. Ansar al-Sharia 
then split between those taking sides with IS and 
al-Baghdadi and those who chose to remain in line 
with Al Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra. The division 
took place without clashes and the two groups co-
exist.
IS undertook to communicate its presence in 
Sirte and decided to do so through terror. In 
February 2015, the organisation made its first 
public appearance, publishing a video of the 
throat-slitting of 21 Egyptian Copts captured 
three months earlier. The organisation’s various 
communication channels now described Sirte 
as the capital of the province of Tripoli (‘asimat 
wilayat trablus). Their strategy aimed to increase 
the ranks of its organisation there to strengthen 
it, while encouraging the dispersion of the 
international coalition’s efforts against IS in Syria 
and Iraq and pushing for military action in Libya. 
For IS, the opening of a new front was perceived 
as a means of gaining more military and political 
power, fostering the arrival of new recruits, and 
legitimising a discourse based on confrontation 
between the Western and Muslim worlds.
This first media appearance of IS in Sirte was 
followed by its taking control of the city, through 
negotiation with its various social components, 
essentially the tribes, and by driving away from 
the city the Ansar al-Sharia minority that had 
refused to swear allegiance to al-Baghdadi. The 
members of this group mostly joined Ansar al-
Sharia in the city of Benghazi. Although IS had to 
deal with several attempts at resistance on the part 
of the local population, particularly the Ferjani 
tribe, these were repressed.
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THE SUCCESS OF IS IN SIRTE: 
ADAPTING TO LOCAL ACTORS 
AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF 
RIVALRIES BETWEEN FACTIONS 
AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.
The choice made by IS to focus on establishing 
itself in Sirte was due to several factors that made 
the city a suitable terrain for the organisation and 
offered prospects for its future expansion. Sirte 
is a coastal city situated in what is known as the 
‘central region’ of Libya, a particularly sensitive 
area because it lies between the ancient provinces 
of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, in the immediate 
vicinity of the oil crescent. This proximity makes 
the city interesting: it provides a platform from 
which to take control of the oil fields and make 
a financial gain from them.9 The location became 
even more decisive after 2014 and the de facto 
division of the country between competing 
political institutions: while Khalifa Haftar led 
Operation Dignity (Karama) in Benghazi and his 
Zintan allies threatened to launch an offensive 
against Tripoli, it was extremely difficult for the 
Libya Dawn coalition (Fajr Libia), ruled by the 
Misrata brigades, to mobilise troops against IS in 
Sirte without putting themselves in danger in the 
capital.
IS found the city of Sirte in ruins and permanently 
weakened militarily. The tribes defeated and 
disarmed in 2011 were no longer able to resist 
the organisation when it decided to conquer the 
city. On the contrary, scores or even hundreds of 
the members of the Warfallah and Qadhadhfa 
tribes chose to join IS. A proportion of them were 
dignitaries and security officials of the Qaddafi 
regime.
The strategy chosen by the jihadi groups in Sirte 
since 2011 enabled them to avoid clashing with the 
local population. In particular, the way in which 
they chose to treat the city’s dignitaries and tribal 
chiefs, considered partisans of the old regime, 
9  After several failed attempts to gain control of the oil fields, 
IS changed its strategy and adopted the strategy of ‘burnt oil’, 
which consists of setting fire to the oil wells and depriving their 
adversaries of the revenue likely to flow out of them. 
proved decisive. Ansar al-Sharia, like IS during the 
first phase of its control over the city, was sensitive 
to the tribes and local dignitaries and consulted 
them about how to manage the city.
Unlike what happened in most of the other Libyan 
cities, the jihadis used neither the great narrative 
of the revolution of 17th February nor its symbols, 
notably the new Libyan flag. They therefore 
adapted to the mind-set of the population of 
Sirte, which would rather “live under the black 
flag (of Ansar al-Sharia and IS) than under that 
of 17th February.”10 Ansar al-Sharia and then IS 
entered into a more religious debate, based on 
belonging not to the revolutionary camp or to the 
old regime but rather to the Ummah, the Islamic 
community. They also firmly insisted on the theme 
of repentance with regard to the followers of the 
old regime: an individual’s political past was of 
little importance if they then repented of their past 
actions. Those who repented and swore allegiance 
to IS were considered full members of the group: 
they had access to weapons and benefited from 
immunity, whatever role they had played in the 
service of the old regime.
After 2011, in Sirte there were two types of 
affiliation with Ansar al-Sharia and then with 
IS: the younger members joined from religious 
conviction; the older ones joined to find refuge 
and a way of taking up arms again and then 
recover the status and social influence they had 
lost after the 2011 defeat. Some also had in mind 
to prepare their revenge against the neighbouring 
city of Misrata, symbol of the revolution.
The jihadi groups focused on keeping order in 
a city that had been left completely alone by the 
new central political institutions and left to the 
criminal militias that took over the city after the 
revolution. They also concentrated on activities 
with a social purpose, especially the provision of 
care and services. The reaction of the inhabitants 
of Sirte towards Ansar al-Sharia and then towards 
IS was one of indifference tinged with distrust. 
At the beginning, IS entered into dialogue and 
consultations with local leaders but then stopped 
10  Interview conducted by Seif Eddin Trabelsi.
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when they felt the balance of force was more 
favourable to them. Thereafter, the governance of 
the city became more authoritarian and repressive.
The increasingly strong coercion and repression 
of the population of Sirte had not yet led to an 
action of the kind and scope that would threaten 
IS’s control over the city. The military weakness 
of the local actors (especially the leaders of the 
principal tribal groups) capable of organising the 
opposition largely explains this relative apathy. 
The IS strategy of not mobilising the repertoire 
of the 17th February revolution, as well as the 
virulence of their anti-Misrata and anti-Libya 
Dawn coalition statements moreover contributed 
to maintaining a degree of adhesion in a city still 
considered a stronghold of the followers of the 
Qaddafi regime. 
Finally, IS has so far benefited from the political 
divisions and competition between the rival 
factions at the national level. Therefore, when 
in March 2015 the military council of Misrata 
undertook to move a large number of its troops 
towards Sirte to fight against IS, when the fighting 
had begun the forces of the city of Zintan allied 
with General Haftar used the threat of an attack on 
Tripoli. This caused the Misrata forces to return to 
the capital, the control of which was considered 
by the Misrata forces and the revolutionary forces 
in general to be far more important than the 
‘recovery’ of Sirte.
As summer 2016 approaches, the situation could 
evolve, however. The growing nervousness of 
the western countries in the face of the lasting 
establishment and possible expansion of IS in 
Libya made regaining control of the city of Sirte 
a major challenge for the various Libyan parties, 
all anxious to prove their strength and assert their 
legitimacy on a national and international scale. 
A new ‘battle of Sirte’ is now expected. Despite IS 
being the target, it could end up in a confrontation 
between rival national forces – on the one side the 
forces allied to General Haftar and on the other the 
forces of Misrata now placed under the authority 
of the presidential council headed by Fa’ez Seraj – 
which could face the local actors in Sirte with the 
necessity of forging new alliances.
CONCLUSION
The various strategies implemented by IS in Libya 
after 2014 reveal that the organisation did not have 
a real agenda for the country. As the shifting of its 
centre of gravity from Derna to Sirte at the end of 
2014 reveals, the organisation was on the contrary 
obliged to adapt its action plan to the situation on 
the ground and to the local logic and dynamics 
that it had to face.
Despite its presence in several cities, IS has 
already been defeated twice in Libya, in Derna 
and in Sabratha.11 In both cases, the defeat was the 
result of action by local forces supported by the 
population, which firmly rejected the organisation’s 
practices and ideology. The conclusion must be 
that the fight against IS cannot be fought without 
the direct participation, in the front line, of local 
forces which have already proved their ability to 
take successful action against the organisation.
Despite the temptation to intervene militarily on 
the part of several western countries, such action 
in Libya could prove counter-productive. It would 
in effect contribute to legitimising the IS theory 
of ‘civilisational’ and anti-Western confrontation 
and attract more foreign fighters. Moreover, it 
would put the local actors opposed to IS and the 
Government of National Accord derived from 
the Libyan Political Accord signed in Skhirat in 
December 2015 in great difficulty, highlighting 
their incapacity to take action in the face of a 
population with a majority hostile to any foreign 
intervention in Libya.
11 In the city of Sabratha, used as a meeting point for Tunisian 
jihadis wanting to join the organisation in Libya or later to head 
for Syria, lS chose to use discretion. This choice is explained 
mainly by the fact that the military balance of power in and 
around the city was generally unfavourable to it. Sabratha is a 
city with a relatively strong military council and is close to the 
capital, like other militarily powerful cities such as Al Zawiya. 
In February 2016, a US raid on a house sheltering IS members 
killed more than 50 people and hastened the clash between the 
military council of Sabratha and the IS cells present in the city. 
In two days marked by violent street combat, the organisation’s 
fighters were either killed or driven out of the city. 
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Although different in timing, scope and intensity, 
the Syrian and Libyan conflicts share common 
patterns and trajectories. In both cases, pro-reform 
civil protests which started in early 2011 rapidly 
gave way to bloody conflicts. As the regimes moved 
to repress these peaceful localized uprisings, 
protesters took up arms and were joined by army 
defectors. The growing intervention of regional 
and international powers has also contributed to 
the expansion of the armed conflicts.
Despite attempts at mediation and conflict 
resolution by the United Nations, the two 
conflicts have continued since 2011, with deep, 
destructive and lasting effects on the people and 
the infrastructure of the two countries. As is often 
the case in countries ravaged by civil wars, they 
have resulted in territorial, military and political 
fragmentation, radicalization of the groups 
and forces involved in the fighting, and major 
transformations in the economic, political and 
social spheres.
One major consequence has been the emergence 
and empowerment of new local actors. They have 
changed power arrangements and structures, and 
have put in motion new dynamics, consequently 
affecting the overall functioning of both the states 
and societies at different levels. For example, the 
various transformations have deeply changed the 
governance of territories, the relationship and 
balance of power between communities, regions 
and central authorities, the political economy of 
subnational entities and the way resources are 
distributed. These transformations need to be 
taken into account both in any analysis of the 
current situation and when looking at the future 
prospects for these countries.
This e-book has aimed to contribute to a better 
understanding of the various local dynamics and 
actors at work in Syria and Libya. The decision 
to address the local dynamics was based on our 
conviction that they play a determining role in 
shaping the overall evolution of the conflicts and 
cannot be neglected when reflecting on ways 
to overcome the crises, facilitate processes of 
conflict resolution and shape durable post-conflict 
settlements.
The eight articles in this e-book do not constitute 
a comparative study of the two conflicts. Instead, 
they try to open the way to more in-depth and 
systematic study of some of the themes which 
are common to both of them: the socio-political 
reality of communities, tribes, cities and villages; 
the challenges of inclusion and representation in 
mediation and conflict-resolution processes; the 
political economy of border areas and violent 
conflicts; the trajectories of Jihadist radicalization; 
the various dynamics of IS territorial penetration; 
and the modalities of intervention by regional and 
international actors and their effects on the local 
scene. In spite of the diversity of the topics covered 
by the different articles, the points below are worth 
stressing here.
1. THE EROSION OR COLLAPSE 
OF THE CENTRAL STATE AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF NEW FORMS OF 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE.
As the conflicts in both Syria and Libya caused 
state institutions to withdraw or rendered them 
ineffective, new non-state actors, both civil and 
military (such as, for instance, local councils, 
elders and notables, charities and NGOs, 
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militias and armed groups), began to fill the 
political, institutional and security vacuums in 
neighbourhoods, villages, cities, communities and 
other local entities. This has led to the establishment 
of a multiplicity of new political ‘orders,’ at times 
overlapping, collaborating or competing.
In the case of Syria, the actors who have, to some 
extent at this stage, succeeded in anchoring 
their political projects to specific territories (the 
Islamic State and the Kurdish PYD) have ruled 
through exclusion, rejection of pluralism and 
monopolistic control of both the military and the 
administration. By contrast, the regions under 
the control of the various opposition factions 
have been characterized by multi-polarity, and 
marked by competing centres of military power 
and competition between both civil and military 
actors for power and resources.
In Libya, the governance structures (such as the 
local and military councils) established at the city 
level during the 2011 war to ensure the provision 
of security and basic services survived as attempts 
were made to create new central political 
authorities by means of elections in 2012 and 2014. 
In 2014, the incapacity of the new central political 
authorities to manage competition between rival 
groups and factions resulted in renewed military 
confrontation between local forces and national 
alliances. This led to a de facto institutional 
division between the west and the east of the 
country, accompanied by a resurgence of the local 
and community-based structures of governance 
and conflict resolution.
In both countries, the crucial role played by local 
forces must be acknowledged and taken better into 
account in the reconstruction of the institutional 
political and military orders. New representation 
and participation mechanisms need to be imagined 
to ensure the effective inclusion of consensual 
and influential local leaders in national political 
dialogues and mediation processes. 
2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICTS.
One of the reasons for the duration, violence 
and destructiveness of the Syrian and Libyan 
armed conflicts has been fierce competition 
for the control of resources. This struggle has 
caused fragmentation of the national economies, 
increased control by military forces over 
economic and financial flows, and the emergence 
or consolidation of new economic centres at the 
expense of pre-war ones, which have been either 
marginalized or destroyed.
The conflicts have caused a re-direction of trade 
and trafficking flows to serve the needs of war 
economies. This has contributed to fostering 
hidden integration between border regions 
and between frontline areas, and it is based on 
smuggling and trafficking of various kinds. As 
a result, new trans-national and sub-national 
economic spaces have emerged.
Financial and humanitarian support provided by 
regional and international powers to selected local 
partners has contributed to increasing the latter’s 
dependency, and has also affected the balance of 
power between rival forces on the ground, even 
though the survival or disappearance of these 
actors has been demonstrated to be linked to other 
factors such as their organizational abilities.
New non-state actors profiting from these 
economic dynamics have gained autonomy from 
the central authorities, prominence at the local 
level and influence in shaping politics, both locally 
and nationally. The post-conflict reconstruction 
and development strategies will have to take fully 
into account the existence of these new networks 
and interdependencies which have contributed 
to reshaping the economic and political maps of 
Syria, Libya and the neighbouring regions.  
INSIDE WARS.  
Local Dynamics of Conflicts in Syria and Libya57
3. THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
FOREIGN INTERVENTION ON 
CONFLICT DYNAMICS.
In 2011, rapid and major foreign military 
intervention against Qaddafi in the Libyan case, 
and the absence of direct and significant support 
for the opposition when massive repression by 
the al-Assad regime started in Syria, dramatically 
affected early developments and the subsequent 
evolution of the two conflicts.
The involvement of external actors has played 
an unintended role in changing local dynamics. 
By providing political and material support 
(legitimacy, international recognition and 
resources) to selected military and non-military 
organizations, foreign actors have contributed to 
shaping new realities on the ground, favouring 
some local forces at the expense of others in a way 
that does not necessarily corresponded to their 
actual weights within the regions or communities 
they originated from. In some cases, their action 
has intensified the competition and increased the 
fragmentation, de-legitimation and corruption of 
the groups supported. Although sectarian, ethnic 
or tribal divisions and rivalries pre-existed in 
Syria and Libya, foreign intervention (including 
humanitarian aid) has often exacerbated them, 
as the competition for the control of territories 
and resources, military confrontation and forced 
displacements have deepened the cleavages 
between communities.
Similarly, the focus now put by foreign actors on 
the fight against the Islamic State is having major 
consequences for the local dynamics in Syria and 
Libya. Actual or claimed participation in this fight 
has become a major legitimizing tool for local 
actors, who have engaged in fierce competition 
for foreign support and recognition. Sometimes 
this support has been used more in the political 
and military struggle with their rivals than against 
IS. Although foreign powers have engaged in or 
threatened direct military intervention against 
IS, experience has shown that the fight against 
the jihadist organization is more successful when 
the various local forces see a common political 
interest in allying against it (and when they have 
the military capacity to do so). Local political 
dynamics – especially the incentives to local 
forces to ally against IS or tolerate or use it in the 
competition for power – are therefore key issues to 
be taken into consideration in shaping an efficient 
strategy against IS.
This e-book did not have the ambition to reach 
definite conclusions on the new forms of local 
governance in Syria and Libya, the political 
economy of armed conflicts or the interplay 
between foreign interventions and local dynamics. 
Instead, in the observations summarized here 
we have highlighted just a few key trends and 
directions that seem to emerge from an initial 
focus on local actors and dynamics in these two 
conflicts. They now require much deeper analysis 
and this is precisely what the EUI-Middle East 
Directions Programme aims to do. The effort we 
are making to refine the analysis of realities at 
the micro level is indispensable to achieve a more 
general understanding of wider and longer-term 
trends and transformations in the MENA region. 
This is an essential step towards shaping and 
effectively using the policy implications that arise 
from our research.
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